This paper shows how competition among governments for mobile firms can bring about excessive differentiation in levels of taxation and public good provision. Hotelling's Principle of Minimum Differentiation is applied in the context of tax competition and shown to be invalid. Instead, when an...

We develop a model of capital income tax competition where taxation can discriminate between different kinds of capital income (corporate income, interest income, and dividends) and various rules of international taxation can be applied. The firms' capital structures and the nature of the...

Under international tax competition, corporate income tax rates are predicted to decrease, and the tax burden will shift onto immobile factors. This case study considers tax changes that illustrate the predictions for Norway 2012-2018. Petroleum rent was taxed at high rates in 2012, and while...

How do countries compete for mobile tax base when they lack precise information on how tax rates affect the tax base? We present a multi-period version of a classic tax competition model in which countries set source-based taxes under incomplete information on the tax base elasticity. This...

The Two-Pillar Solution agreed by 137 countries on 8 October 2021 has been hailed as “historic” and a “a once-in-a-generation accomplishment for economic diplomacy.” To a significant extent, this is due to the expected impact of Pillar 2 (essentially a global minimum tax) on tax...

Two of the most controversial questions relating to Pillar 2 are the extent to which it will allow countries to engage in tax competition, and which countries will collect the tax revenues it generates. The Model Rules published by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on 20 December 2021 provide...

Should (or when should) separate governments, including sub-units in a federal system, be encouraged to engage in tax competition rather than harmonizing their tax systems? The question is akin to asking when government should be used to solve collective action problems through coercion, and...

Should (or when should) separate governments, including sub-units in a federal system, be encouraged to engage in tax competition rather than harmonizing their tax systems? The question is akin to asking when government should be used to solve collective action problems through coercion, and...

The Global Minimum Tax (GMT) is applied only to firms above a certain size threshold, permitting countries to set differential tax rates for small and large firms. We analyse tax competition between a tax haven and a non-haven country for heterogeneous multinationals to evaluate the effects of...

We set up a model of generalised oligopoly where two countries of different size compete for an exogenous, but variable, number of identical firms. The model combines a desire by national governments to attract internationally mobile firms with the existence of location rents that arise even in...