Recent literature has shown that all-pay auctions raise more money for charity than winner-pay auctions. We demonstrate that the first and second-price winner-pay auctions generate higher revenue than first-price all-pay auctions when bidders are sufficiently asymmetric. To prove it, we consider...

We extend the war of attrition and all-pay auction analysis of Krishna and Morgan (1997) to a stochastic competition setting. We determine the existence of equilibrium bidding strategies and discuss the potential shape of these strategies. Results for the war of attrition contrast with the...

We study the optimal entry fee in a symmetric private value first-price auction with signaling, in which the participation decisions and the auction outcome are used by an outside observer to infer the bidders' types. We show that this auction has a unique fully separating equilibrium bidding...

We propose a simple mechanism providing incentives to reduce harmful emissions to their efficient level without infracting upon productive efficiency. The mechanism employs a contest creating incentives among participating nations to simultaneously exert efficient productive and efficient...

This paper examines a perfectly discriminating contest (all-pay auction) with two asymmetric players. We focus on unordered valuations. Valuations are endogenous (polynomial functions) and depend on the effort each player invests in the contest. The shape of the valuation function is common...

Recent literature has shown that all-pay auctions raise more money for charity than either winner-pay auctions or lotteries. We demonstrate that first-price and second-price winner- pay auctions have a better revenue performance than first-price and second-price all-pay auctions when bidders are...