This paper analyzes policy competition for a foreign-owned monopolist firm between two asymmetric countries. In particular, one country has a larger economy than the other country does. At the same time, the small country produces an intermediate good for the final good production, while the...

Tax incentives are a key component of governments’ investment policy mix as they directly impact companies’ tax burden. In this paper, we illustrate the EU’s tax attractiveness as investment location over time in terms of effective average tax rates and evaluate potential tax reform...

We evaluate the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. Combining reduced-form estimates from tax data with a global investment model, we estimate responses, identify parameters, and conduct counterfactuals. Domestic investment of firms with the mean tax change increases 20% versus a no-change baseline. Due...

We examine how the bidding environment may affect the outcome of tax competition between two countries (or two regions) in attracting a firm's foreign direct investment (FDI).We compare the equilibrium location choice and payoffs from an English auction, with both complete and incomplete...

This paper models inter-jurisdiction competition for foreign direct investment and optimal government policy intervention to protect the national interest. The inter-jurisdiction competition for a multinational has the potential of favouring the multinational and of becoming detrimental for the...

This paper develops a model of a monopolistically competitive industry with extensive and intensive business investment and shows how these margins respond to changes in average and marginal corporate tax rates. Intensive investment refers to the size of a firm's capital stock. Extensive...

Profit shifting of multinational corporations (MNCs) negatively affects citizens, governments as well as other companies in the European Union. This consensus seems to be emerging in spite of the fact that the phenomenon of profit shifting is unobservable directly and therefore only indirect and...