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In models of sequential decision making herd behaviour occurs if the signals smart(dumb) agents receive are (un)correlated and if agents have reputational concerns. We show thatintroducing costly effort to become informed about project payoffs (i) eliminates herdbehaviour and (ii) shifts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256752
This paper examines the incentives for a party leader in office and for a parties' rank-and-file to replace a sitting member of parliament. As to the leader's decision, we show that the leader prefers to replace a critical member of parliament who votes against the leader's policy. A competent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256813
the representative voter’s point of view. We show that when parties are office motivated the voting rule should encourage … parties to collect information. Voting rules that focus on the opposition party sometimes dominate voting rules that focus on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256947
value of the project and about being considered well informed. Before voting on the project, members can exchange their … differ considerably from those of the member casting the decisive vote. Our last result is that the optimal voting rule …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257003
competition between two political parties. We show that, by coordinating voting behavior,these interest groups increase the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257034
This paper studies the internal organizational design of politicalinstitutions in presence of lobbying. We consider a legislature ascomposed of two bodies: the floor and an informational committee. Thefloor has the (formal) power to choose the policy to be implemented.The policy outcome is ex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257116
We develop a simple two period model to study the importance of motivational differences among politicians in describing the role of elections and explaining policy choices. In our model, politicians differ in their motives of running public office. Good politicians care about policies while bad...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257195
A well-known rationale for representative democracy is that direct democracy leads to a free-rider problem as to the collection of information. A problem with this rationale is that it takes for granted that representatives collect information. In this paper we examine whether or not electoral...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257368
Decisions-makers often rely on information supplied by interested parties. In practice, some parties have easier access to information than other parties. In this light, we examine whether more powerful parties have a disproportionate influence on decisions. We show that more powerful parties...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257417
Politicians differ in their ability to implement some policy. In an election, candidates make commitments regarding the plans they will try to implement if elected. These serve as a signal of true ability. In equilibrium, candidates make overambitious promises. The candidate with the highest...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257472