using laboratory experiments. A purely rational choice perspective of a simple voting environment implies that information …

This paper uses experiments to explore electoral accountability in a legislative system that favors seniority. Voters …

voting outcome in period t becomes the status quo in period t+1. We study symmetric Markov equilibria of the resulting game … alternative, and the discount factor (committee "impatience"). We report several new findings. Voting behavior is selfish and …

We contrast and compare three ways of predicting efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game. The …

We contrast and compare three ways of predicting efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game. The …

We contrast and compare three ways of predicting efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game. The …

observed in threshold public good experiments. The model is applied in a variety of dierent settings : we compare games with a …We propose and develop a model of behavior in threshold public good games. The model draws on learning direction theory …

games designed to model common-pools in which there existed such a threshold: one with complete information of the threshold …, one with incomplete information of the threshold and one with sporadically enforced targets. By design the true threshold … was unknown to the players in the role of policymaker, and the guesses of the threshold value were allowed to change …