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Kwiek, Maksymilian; Marreiros, Helia; Vlassopoulos, Michael - 2018

more often than simple majority. In a series of laboratory experiments, we investigate how various rules affect the outcome …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011872697

Governing collective action in the face of observational error

Markussen, Thomas; Putterman, Louis G.; Wang, Liangjun - 2017

We present results from a repeated public goods experiment where subjects choose by vote one of two sanctioning schemes: peer-to-peer (informal) or centralized (formal). We introduce, in some treatments, a moderate amount of noise (a 10 percent probability that a contribution is reported...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012058652

Voting on punishment systems within a heterogeneous group

Noussair, Charles N.; Tan, Fangfang - 2009

productivity. Nevertheless, only a minority of sessions converge to this system, indicating a tendency for the voting process to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276039

Give everybody a voice! The power of voting in a public goods experiment with externalities

Engel, Christoph; Rockenbach, Bettina - 2014

We study the effect of voting when insiders´ public goods provision may affect passive outsiders. Without voting …. Voting on the recommended contribution level enhances contributions if outsiders are unaffected and internalizes the negative … externality by lowering contributions when outsiders are negatively affected. Remarkably, voting does not increase contributions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010478914

Tipping versus Cooperating to Supply a Public Good

Barrett, Scott; Dannenberg, Astrid - 2015

In some important multi-player situations, such as efforts to supply a global public good, players can choose the game they want to play. In this paper we conduct an experimental test of the decision to choose between a tipping game, in which every player wants to contribute to the public good...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010500436

Can endogenously chosen institutions mitigate the free-rider problem and reduce perverse punishment?

Ertan, Arhan; Page, Talbot; Putterman, Louis - 2005

Previous experiments on public goods dilemmas have found that the opportunity to punish leads to higher contributions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318915

Self-Organization for collective action: An experimental study of voting on formal, informal, and no sanction regimes

Markussen, Thomas; Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2011

). Being adopted by voting appears to enhance the efficiency of both informal sanctions and non-deterrent formal sanctions. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287722

Setting the Bar - An Experimental Investigation of Immigration Requirements

Khadjavi, Menusch; Tjaden, Jasper D. - In: Journal of Public Economics 165 (2018), pp. 160-169

employ the minimal group paradigm and immigration requirements are set by in-group voting. In order to immigrate, out …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012511626

Give everybody a voice! : the power of voting in a public goods experiment with externalities

Engel, Christoph; Rockenbach, Bettina - 2014

We study the effect of voting when insiders ́public goods provision may affect passive outsiders. Without voting …. Voting on the recommended contribution level enhances contributions if outsiders are unaffected and internalizes the negative … externality by lowering contributions when outsiders are negatively affected. Remarkably, voting does not increase contributions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010429972

Tipping versus cooperating to supply a public good

Barrett, Scott; Dannenberg, Astrid - 2015

In some important multi-player situations, such as efforts to supply a global public good, players can choose the game they want to play. In this paper we conduct an experimental test of the decision to choose between a “tipping” game, in which every player wants to contribute to the public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010496893