This paper examines the interplay between financial market trading and product market competition. An entrant learns about product demand from trading volume in incumbent firm’s stock market before his entry decision. Without initial stake in incumbent firm, an informed investor trades on her...

Extending Milgrom and Roberts (1982) we present an infinite horizon entry model, where the incumbent(s) may use the current price to signal its strength to deter entry. We show that, due to the importance of entrants' types on the post-entry duopoly/oligopoly profits, the incumbent(s) may want...

This paper studies price discrimination using observables that are manipulable by the buyers at a cost. Rather than deterring manipulation, the optimal price discrimination mechanism (OPDM) offers each observable a personalized price that induces the buyers to pretend to have a lower valuation....

This paper provides a sufficient condition under which a general screening problem can be reduced, without the principal’s payoff loss, to one with the single crossing property. The sufficient condition requires the agent’s types to be ordered in a way that two marginal rates of substitution...

This paper studies a bilateral trade game where (i) the buyer is uncertain about her desired consumption amount (needs) of a perfectly divisible good and receives a signal about it, (ii) and the seller posts a take-it-or-leave-it price to the buyer. The seller's information design trades off...

A monopoly seller who faces ambiguity about the consumption plans of a buyer wishes to design a robust price menu that maximizes her guaranteed (worst-case) profit. We show that an optimal total-price menu can simply be linear in quantity under general conditions and that this qualitative result...

In this paper, the interactions between a large informed trader (IT, for short) and a high-frequency trader (HFT, for short) who can anticipate the former's incoming order are studied in an extended Kyle's model. Equilibria under various specific situations are discussed. We find that, in...

The paper studies the canonical hold-up problem with one-sided investment by the buyer and full ex post bargaining power by the seller. The buyer can covertly choose any distribution of valuations at a cost and privately observes her valuation. The main result shows that in contrast to the...

Platform-run marketplaces may exploit third-party sellers' data to develop competing products, but potential for future competition can deter sellers' entry. We explore how this trade-off affects the platform's referral fee and its own entry decision. We first characterize the platform's optimal...

Have post-crisis reforms purged mortgage markets of adverse selection? I show that loans synthetically sold by Fannie Mae through Credit Risk Transfers are ex post riskier, controlling for observable quality, than those they keep on balance. Transfers that go unreported on public data are...