This paper undertakes a critical review of the prospect that self-learning pricing algorithms will lead to widespread collusion independently of the intervention and participation of humans. There is no concrete evidence, no example yet, and no antitrust case that self-learning pricing...

This paper analyzes the trade of information between a data buyer and a data seller. The data buyer faces a decision problem under uncertainty and seeks to augment his initial private information with supplemental data. The data seller is uncertain about the willingness-to-pay of the data buyer...

Market makers in some financial markets often make offsetting trades and have significant market power. We develop a market making model that captures these market features as well as other important characteristics such as information asymmetry and inventory risk. In contrast to the existing...

A platform matches agents from two sides of a market to create a trading opportunity between them. The agents subscribe to the platform by paying subscription fees which are contingent on their reported private types, and then engage in strategic interactions with their matched partner(s). A...

This paper considers the generation and provision of data products in the markets for information. Buyers face a decision problem with uncertainty of two states. They can purchase experiments to augment their private information. A buyer's willingness to pay for an experiment depends on his...

An intermediary has the technology to provide information about a product to consumers and serves as a platform through which transactions between a monopoly and consumers take place. This paper explores the intermediary's revenue maximization problem across all possible business models. By...

This paper investigates optimal price mechanism for a monopolistic ride-hailing platform in a two-sided market setting. Our main result shows that the optimal price mechanism depends on the concavity of consumers' valuation distribution. When con- sumers' valuation distribution is concave, fully...

A profit-maximizing monopolist sells multi-attribute consumer data to a firm. The seller is uncertain about which consumer characteristic the buyer is interested in forecasting and how much the buyer values information. In order to screen among buyers along both margins, the seller chooses a...

A monopolist sells an object characterized by multiple attributes. A buyer can be one of many types, differing in their willingness to pay for each attribute. The seller can provide arbitrary attribute information in the form of a statistical experiment. To screen different types, the seller...

Network externality is a prominent feature of increasingly many products: the marginal payoff of one's consumption increases as his neighbors consume more. In- formation of network structure is important to the seller, but is often privately known to the buyers. We model a monopoly's optimal...