Pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) in dynamic cake sharing problems are analyzed. Each player chooses under perfect information how much to eat from the current cake and how much to leave to the next period. The left over cake grows according to a given growth function. With linear...

This paper characterizes the subgame-perfect pure-strategy equilibrium paths in discounted supergames with perfect monitoring. It is shown that all the equilibrium paths are composed of fragments called elementary subpaths. This characterization result is complemented with an algorithm for...

We examine the effect of the replacement rule of a social insurance system on sickness absence. The elasticity of absence with respect to the benefit level is a critical parameter in defining the optimal sickness insurance scheme. A pre-determined, piecewise linear policy rule in which the...

Equilibrium payoffs corresponding to subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies are characterized for infinitely repeated games with discounted payoffs. The equilibrium payoff set of a game is a fixed-point of set-valued operators introduced in the paper. The new operator formalism is...

This paper considers subgame perfect equilibria of continuous-time repeated games with perfect monitoring when immediate reactions to deviations are allowed. The set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs is shown to be a fixed-point of a set-valued operator introduced in the paper. For a large...

This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study beliefs and their relationship to action and strategy choices in finitely and indefinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games. We find subjects' beliefs about the other player's action are accurate despite some systematic deviations corresponding...

Agents interacting on a body of water choose between technologiesto catch …sh. One is harmless to the resource, as it allows full recovery;the other yields high immediate catches, but low(er) future catches.Strategic interaction in one ‘objective’resource game may induceseveral ‘subjective’...

We introduce a stochastic game in which transition probabilitiesdepend on the history of the play, i.e., the players’past action choices.To solve this new type of game under the limiting average reward crite-rion, we determine the set of jointly-convergent pure-strategy rewardswhich can be...

A well—known result from the theory of finitely repeated games statesthat if the stage game has a unique equilibrium, then there is a uniquesubgame perfect equilibrium in the finitely repeated game in which theequilibrium of the stage game is being played in every period. Here Ishow that this...

It is well known that the rock-paper-scissors game has no pure saddle point. Weshow that this holds more generally: A symmetric two-player zero-sum game hasa pure saddle point if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors game.Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric...