We model a market for news where profit maximizing media outlets choose their editors from a population of rational citizens. We show that when information acquisition is costly, liberal (conservative) citizens find optimal to acquire information from a media outlet having a liberal...

We use a limited information environment to mimic the state of confusion in an experimental, repeated public goods game. The results show that reinforcement learning leads to dynamics similar to those observed in standard public goods games. However, closer inspection shows that individual decay...

We study a dynamic game in which all players initially possess the same information and coordinate on a high level of activity. Eventually, players with a long string of bad experiences become inactive. This prospect can cause a coordination avalanche in which all activity in the population...

We report 28 new experiment sessions consisting of up to three experience levels to examine the robustness of learning and "error" elimination among participants in a laboratory asset market and its effect on price bubbles. Our answer to the title question is: "yes." We impose a large increase...

In this paper we analyse the role of asymmetric information between firms and consumers about market conditions.

This paper proposes an aspiration-based model of bounded rationality, which is applied to a large-population context where agents are re-matched every period to play a Prisoner's Dilemma.

We analyze first-order beliefs in a variation of the Public Good Game. We show that (1) the role that belief elicitation plays in the experiment affects both the contribution behavior and beliefs, and (2) framing influences stated beliefs, as much as contribution behavior. In the second part of...

We construct a dynamic equilibrium model where there is costly search in the goods market and the labor market. Incorporating shocks to money growth and productivity, we calibrate the model to the US time series data to examine the model's quantitative predictions on aggregate variables and, in...