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Carraro, Carlo; Marchiori, Carmen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

relationship between the incentives to defect from a coalition, the size of the resulting equilibrium coalition structure and the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791385

Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents

Besley, Timothy J.; Ghatak, Maitreesh - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

staffed by motivated agents who subscribe to the mission. This Paper studies incentives in such contexts and emphasizes the … for high-powered incentives. The framework developed in this Paper is applied to non-profits, school competition, and … incentives in the public sector. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791396

Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives

Meyer, Margaret A; Vickers, John - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1995

-agent relationships by improving the trade-off between insurance and incentives in the design of explicit contracts. In dynamic settings …, however, there may be implicit as well as explicit incentives (e.g. managerial career concerns and the ratchet effect in … regulation). We show that the dynamic effects of CPI on implicit incentives can either reinforce or oppose the familiar (static …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791400

Contracts, Externalities and Incentives in Shopping Malls

Gould, Eric D; Pashigian, B. Peter; Prendergast, Canice - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

allocation and pricing of space and an efficient allocation of incentives across stores. Certain stores generate externalities by …: (i) efficiently price the net externality of each store, and (ii) align the incentives to induce optimal effort by the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791485

Economic and Environmental Effectiveness of a Technology-based Protocol

Buchner, Barbara; Carraro, Carlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

self-enforcement (namely, the absence of incentives to free ride) of the coalition that would form when countries negotiate …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791506

Equilibrium Incentive Contracts

Moen, Espen R; Rosén, Åsa - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We study a labour market in which firms can observe workers’ output but not their effort, and in which a worker’s productivity in a given firm depends on a worker-firm specific component, unobservable for the firm. Firms offer wage contracts that optimally trade off effort and wage costs. As...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791700

On the Optimal Number of Representatives

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Gary-Bobo, Robert J. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We propose a normative theory of the number of representatives based on a stylized model of a representative democracy. We derive a simple formula, a "square-root theory" which gives the number of representatives in parliament as proportional to the square root of total population. Simple...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791717

Joint Production in Teams

Battaglini, Marco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

Consider Holmström.s moral hazard in teams problem when there are n agents, each agent i has a a(i)-dimensional strategy space and output can be m-dimensional. We show that a compensation mechanism that satisfies budget balance, limited liability and implements an efficient allocation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791765

The Economics of US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style Conditional Fees

Emons, Winand; Garoupa, Nuno - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

. Contingent fees provide better incentives than conditional fees independently of whether upfront payments are restricted to be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791953

The Flattening Firm and Product Market Competition

Guadalupe, Maria; Wulf, Julie - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

pay as well as local (division-level) and global (firm-level) incentives. Our estimates show that for the average firm …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792092