In developed economies the high material production of the goods satisfy new and diversified necessities. Individual and social needs in a permanent dynamic have determined the need to develop services faster than the speed of diversification of properties. Mostly modern economy is producing and...

Работа посвящена экономической теории социального сектора и отражает результаты многолетних исследований автора в данной области. В статье содержится анализ...

We develop a theory of decision making and General Equilibrium for contingent markets when incomplete preferences are generated by second-order stochastic dominance (SSD). Demand, Pareto-optima and equilibria dominance are fully characterized. Demands and equilibrium allocations are...

This paper analyses quality discrimination when the monopolist provides two types of qualities for two-types of users, for example, in the software market. The users using software are confronted with two types of quality in using the software: one is related to learning, while the other is...

Stackelberg-like games show a situation where there is a clear advantage in moving first. In a thought provoking article, Bagwell [1995] shows that this advantage may not be robust against imperfect observations of the first move. We explore these ideas in the context of forward induction in...

In simultaneous ascending price auctions with heterogeneous goods Brusco and Lopomo [2002] derive collusive equilibria, where bidders divide objects among themselves, while keeping the prices low. Considering a simultaneous ascending price auction with a fixed deadline, i.e. the hard close...

The article analyzes how a defender determines a balance between protecting an object (passive defense) and striking preventively against an attacker seeking to destroy the object (active defense). The attacker analogously determines a balance between attacking and protecting against the...

We study a non-cooperative model of unilateral network formation. Derks et al. [2008b] prove the existence of local-Nash and global-Nash networks for games with payoff functions that satisfy a framework of axiomatic properties. These properties are inspired by the one-way flow model, which is...

In a strategic coalitional game, we consider the relations among four cores α, β, γ, and the one we call δ which is obtained by slightly weakening the conjectural cooperative equilibria due to Currarini and Marini. We show that the α-core and the γ-core are refined by the δ-core; and,...

This article studies how a mechanism designer can influence games by promising payments to the players depending on their mutual choice of strategies. First, we investigate the cost of implementing a desirable behavior and present algorithms to compute this cost. Whereas a mechanism designer can...