In this paper I apply the work of Abrams and Iossifov (2006) to monetary policy in canada to see if same political party affiliation is needed to produce evidence of political opportunism. After modifying their anaylsis to maintain consistency in the time series dimensions of their variables for...

This paper analyzes the institutional framework of central banks in ten Central and East European countries using the ECB as benchmark. It looks at the legislated objectives of these central banks, assesses the degree of political and functional independence and the status of their democratic...

The attributes of consistency, purposefulness, coherency, competitiveness and completeness (exhaustivity) are specific to modern monetary policy. They contribute to ensuring the efficiency of the monetary policy in a context of uncertainty and volatility of monetary-financial variables and...

There is a widespread agreement among central bankers around the world that the stability of the national currency should be entrusted to independent central banks. There are two arguments supporting this idea: 1. to achieve macroeconomic stability, a low and stable inflation is required, an...

The paper examines the evolution of monetary policy design in Australia which has culminated in the adoption of inflation targeting using the institutional mechanism of central bank independence. A Vector Error Correction Model is specified linking inflation to measures of central bank...

This paper investigates the argument for Central Bank Independence (CBI) in the case of Greece. Using a time series approach and the last data available before Greece joined the EMU, the hypothesis that central bank independence is important for controlling inflation is examined. Employing two...

In this survey, we critically review the argument for central bank independence (CBI). We argue CBI is neither necessary nor sufficient for reaching monetary stability. First, CBI is just one potentially useful monetary policy design instrument among several. Second, CBI should not be treated as...

Is there a fundamental conflict between insulating monetary policy from popular pressures, seen as essential to sound monetary policy, and making policy responsive to the popular will, seen as fundamental to democracy? We argue that strongly independent monetary policy is not inconsistent with...

This paper demonstrates that recent influential contributions to monetary policy imply an emerging consensus whereby neither rigid rules nor complete discretion are found optimal. Instead, middle-ground monetary regimes based on rules (operative under ‘normal’ circumstances) to anchor...

This paper examines the effect of government ideology on monetary policy in a quarterly data set of 15 OECD countries in the period 1980.1–2005.4. Our Taylor-rule specification focuses on the interactions of a new time-variant indicator for central bank independence and government ideology....