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We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of equilibria with only two active players in the all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities. This condition shows that the generic equilibrium of the standard all-pay auction is robust to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316873
This article investigates the impact of the distribution of preferences on equilibrium behavior in conflicts that are modeled as all-pay auctions with identity-dependent externalities. In this context, we define centrists and radicals using a willingness-to-pay criterion that admits preferences...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281941
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011374032
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377127
We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of equilibria with only two active players in the all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities. This condition shows that the generic equilibrium of the standard all-pay auction is robust to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009747790
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008934954
We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of equilibria with only two active players in the all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities. This condition shows that the generic equilibrium of the standard all-pay auction is robust to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010638889
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009783236
This article investigates the impact of the distribution of preferences on equilibrium behavior in conflicts that are modeled as all-pay auctions with identity-dependent externalities. In this context, we define centrists and radicals using a willingness-topay criterion that admits preferences...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817400
We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of equilibria with only two active players in the all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities. This condition shows that the generic equilibrium of the standard all-pay auction is robust to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817431