Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig identify the key problems in banking as excessive borrowing and risk-taking, increased interconnectedness between banks, ineffective regulation and supervision, distortions and inefficiencies from explicit or implicit government guarantees and subsidies, and...

We present a simple model of an economy with heterogeneous banks that may be funded with uninsured deposits and equity capital. Capital serves to ameliorate a moral hazard problem in the choice of risk. There is a fixed aggregate supply of bank capital, so the cost of capital is endogenous. A...

We study the interplay of capital and liquidity regulation in a general equilibrium setting by focusing on future funding risks. The model consists of a banking sector with long-term illiquid investment opportunities that need to be financed by short-term debt and by issuing equity. Reliance on...

We analyze the cyclical effects of moving from risk-insensitive (Basel I) to risk-sensitive (Basel II) capital requirements in the context of a dynamic equilibrium model of relationship lending in which banks are unable to access the equity markets every period. Banks anticipate that shocks to...

Basel II’s New Standardized Approach: Possible Effects of Implementation Katherine Wyatt New York State Banking Department Abstract The New York State Banking Department surveyed 33 institutions in 2001 and 2002 for a study of the possible effects of the Standardized Approach of the proposed...

The authors of the paper discuss reasons as well as current stage of the regulation of the financial (mostly banking) sector. They are not in favor of strict rejection of the regulation, but they are not in favor of strong regulation of the financial sector either. The article is based on the...

We present a model of an economy with heterogeneous banks that may be funded with uninsured deposits and equity capital. Capital serves to ameliorate a moral hazard problem in the choice of risk. There is a fixed aggregate supply of bank capital, so the cost of capital is endogenous. A regulator...

We present a simple model of an economy with heterogeneous banks that may be funded with uninsured deposits and equity capital. Capital serves to ameliorate a moral hazard problem in the choice of risk. There is a fixed aggregate supply of bank capital, so the cost of capital is endogenous. A...

We assess the procyclical effects of bank capital regulation in a dynamic equilibrium model of relationship lending in which banks are unable to access the equity markets every period. Banks anticipate that shocks to their earnings as well as the cyclical position of the economy can impair their...