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Der KMD-Kartellcheck : Marktscreening nach Kartellstrukturen am Beispiel des deutschen Zementmarkts

Lorenz, Christian - 2005

analysis and investigates whether they operate efficiently. The CFD cartel-audit should enable the detection of cartels via … patterns. The CFD cartel-audit attempts to draw conclusions from these patterns in order to find hidden cartels and to engage … antitrust agencies inot additional more detailed audits. -- cartel ; collusion ; price fixing ; collusive marker ; cartel audit …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009349855

Imperfect Tacit Collusion and Asymmetric Price Transmission

Bulutay, Muhammed; Hales, David; Julius, Patrick; … - 2021

We investigate asymmetric price transmission (APT) in laboratory experiments and find that imperfect tacit collusion is likely the cause in our otherwise frictionless markets. We vary the number of sellers across markets to evaluate the role competition plays in APT. We report similar magnitudes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013312514

Algorithmic and Human Collusion

Werner, Tobias - 2021

As self-learning pricing algorithms become popular, there are growing concerns among academics and regulators that algorithms could learn to collude tacitly on non-competitive prices and thereby harm competition. I study popular reinforcement learning algorithms and show that they develop...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013313463

Collusion in markets with syndication

Hatfield, John William; Kominers, Scott Duke; Lowery, … - 2018

Many markets, including markets for IPOs and debt issuances, are syndicated: each winning bidder invites competitors to join its syndicate to complete production. Using repeated extensive form games, we show that collusion in syndicated markets may become easier as market concentration falls,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011901727

Price-directed search and collusion

Obradovits, Martin; Plaickner, Philipp - 2020

collusion and merely consumer rents are transferred, or both welfare and consumer rents are reduced. An all-inclusive cartel …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012241989

Preferential trade liberalization with endogenous cartel discipline : implications for welfare and optimal trade policies

Agnosteva, Delina; Syropoulos, Constantinos; Yotov, Yoto - 2020

We consider an international cartel whose members interact repeatedly in their own as well as in third …-country segmented markets. Cartel discipline-an inverse measure of the degree of competition between firms-is endogenously determined by … the cartel’s incentive compatibility constraint (ICC), which links strategically markets that are seemingly unrelated …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012287796

Passive backward acquisitions and downstream collusion

Shekhar, Shiva; Thomes, Tim Paul - 2020

collusive price that is set by the cartel to increase the acquirer's profit from its claim on the upstream margin. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012297609

Nationalization as credible threat against tacit collusion

Delbono, Flavio; Lambertini, Luca - 2014

Within a simple model of differentiated oligopoly, we show that tacit collusion may be prevented by the threat of nationalising a private firm coupled with the appropriate choice of the weight given to private profits in the maximand of the nationalised company. We characterise the properties of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011725688

Responsibility-based allocation of cartel damages

Napel, Stefan; Welter, Dominik - 2017

Anti-trust infringers are liable jointly and severally, i.e., any offender may be sued and forced to compensate a victim on behalf of all. EU law then grants the singled-out firm a right to internal redress: all infringers are obliged to contribute in proportion to their relative responsibility...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011698019

On globally optimal punishments in the repeated cournot game

Delbono, Flavio; Lambertini, Luca - 2016

We challenge the global optimality of one-shot punishments in infinitely repeated games with discounting. Specifically, we show that the stick-and-carrot punishment à la Abreu (1986) may not be globally optimal. We prove our result by investigating tacit collusion in the infinite repetition of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011703311