This paper studies the interplay between deadlines and cognitive limitations. We analyze an agent's decision to complete a one-off task under a deadline. Postponing the task can be beneficial for the agent; missing the deadline, however, leads to a drop in the agent's rewards. If the agent...

Why are time-inconsistent preferences widespread among decision makers? This paper provides a possible explanation by showing that time-inconsistent preferences could be beneficial for decision makers that work together. Time-inconsistent preferences – which are usually blamed for having...

We consider a brand manufacturer who can offer, next to its high-quality product, also a decoy good and faces competition by a competitive fringe that produces low quality. We show that the brand manufacturer optimally provides a decoy good to boost the demand for its main product if consumers'...

We experimentally study strategic procrastination in a dynamic team environment. Two team members work for a finite number of periods on a joint project. The project’s success probability depends on the effort provided by both group members. Payment is conditional on finishing the project...

This paper demonstrates that a principal may optimally remunerate her agents unequally, even if these have equal characteristics. We show this in a simple moral hazard model where agents' efforts are continuous choice variables. Unequal remuneration allows the principal to minimize...

To study whether a soft commitment device can help students succeed, we conduct a randomized field experiment and follow a cohort of tertiary students over six years. Students can commit to following their recommended study program structure, and they receive reminders each semester. This easily...