I study a two-period model of conflict with two combatants and a third party who is an ally of one of the combatants …. There exist perfect Bayesian equilibria in which the third party's intervention worsens the conflict by energizing her ally … to withdraw from or stay in the conflict is based on her prior beliefs and not on the current conditions of the conflict …

I study a two-period model of conflict with two combatants and a third party who is an ally of one of the combatants …. There exist perfect Bayesian equilibria in which the third party’s intervention worsens the conflict by energizing her ally … to withdraw from or stay in the conflict is based on her prior beliefs and not on the current conditions of the conflict …

I study a two-period model of conflict with two combatants and a third party who is an ally of one of the combatants …. There exist perfect Bayesian equilibria in which the third party’s intervention worsens the conflict by energizing her ally … to withdraw from or stay in the conflict is based on her prior beliefs and not on the current conditions of the conflict …

conflict and more intense fighting. …

alliance, and the role of in-group favoritism. -- Alliances ; contests ; conflict ; in-group favoritism …

We introduce three variations of the Hirshleifer-Skaperdas conflict game to study experimentally the effects of post-conflict … altogether, often after substantial initial conflict. To attain peace, players must first engage in costly signaling by making …

We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the … asymmetry and complementarity in members'efforts, and analyze how each group's internal conflict in-fluences its chance of … winning in the external conflict. We find that a more symmetric group may expend more effort in external conflict when the …

nations, as in a strategic game of international conflict handing over military spending decisions to citizens who face a …

partly spills over into the next period, by affecting relative conflict efficiency. Our model generates non …-monotone evolution of both conflict and distribution. Results suggest that external interventions, when effective in reducing current … conflict and protecting weaker groups, may end up sowing the seeds of greater future conflict. …

This paper considers evolutionarily stable decisions about whether to initiate violent conflict rather than accepting a … of peaceful resource allocations that are rejected in favor of violent conflict, compared to the Nash equilibrium …