This paper provides existence results for a large class of covertly collusive outcomes in oligopoly markets. In particular, the paper shows that the Alpha-core is non-empty in linear industries with any asymmetric costs and any asymmetric capacity bounds (JEL C62, C71, D43, L13).

This paper first inverts a general class of matrices for solving Bertrand equilibria from arbitrary coalition structures in linear Bertand oligopolies. It then studies merger incentives and obtains two main results; 1) for any asymmetric costs, mergers of any size are profitable; 2) a merger will...

We introduce a strategic market game for an exchange economy not having enough commodity money. We show the existence of a non-cooperative equilibrium for any finite replication economy with a mutual bank, we then show that efficient trade can be achieved in the limiting economy by expanding the...

A specific structure is added to the model of Bayesian society, and the associated (more involved) version of the Bayesian incentive compatible strong equilibrium concept is proposed. The equilibrium endogenously explains whether or not player j in coalition S, in pursuit of his self-interest,...