Showing 111 - 120 of 65,145
This paper considers a resource allocation mechanism that utilizes a profit-maximizing auctioneer/matchmaker in the Kelso–Crawford (1982) (many-to-one) assignment problem. We consider general and simple (individualized price) message spaces for firmsʼ reports following Milgrom (2010). We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049796
learning process converges in polynomial time to the core.  While convergence to the core is known for some types of … random walks and matching theory. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071726
We provide a new proof of the non-emptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their "balanced cover games", which are non-empty, can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011099068
In this paper we investigate some new applications of Scarf's Lemma. First, we introduce the notion of fractional core … interpretation of these results for matching games. Finally we consider an even more general setting where players' contributions in … in many practical applications, such as NRMP (National Resident Matching Program). …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010693804
) blocking dynamics in two-sided one-to-one matching markets with continuous side payments (assignment problems, Shapley and … obtained from the previous one by satisfying a blocking pair (i.e., by matching the two blocking agents and assigning new … the model (i.e., for marriage markets, one-to-one matching, or discretized assignment problems), the existence of blocking …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010696483
We consider the problem of axiomatizing the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. We first show that several axiomatizations of the Shapley value on the class of all TU-games do not characterize this solution on the class of assignment games by providing alternative solutions that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326342
Howard (1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well. However, by defining a social choice correspondence that is based on the solution rather than on its...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272596
. First we present an O(nm+n2 log n) algorithm that tests if the core of a matching game defined on a weighted graph with n … with payments. Second we show that the nucleolus of an n-player matching game with a nonempty core can be computed in O(n4 …A matching game is a cooperative game (N; v) defined on a graph G = (N;E) with an edge weighting w : E ! R+. The player …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494480
v with pu+pv<w(uv). By pinpointing a relationship to the accessibility of the coalition structure core of matching games … is to find a stable solution. A solution is a matching M with a vector p.RV that satisfies pu+pv=w(uv) for all uv.M and … blocking value, respectively, are NP-complete. Finally, we prove that the first problem is NP-complete also when a matching is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494512
This paper introduces a class of endogenously proportional bargaining solutions. These solutions are independent of the class of Directional solutions, which Chun and Thomson (1990a) proposed to generalize (exogenously) proportional solutions of Kalai (1977). Endogenously proportional solutions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010500229