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Solutions for the Stable Roommates Problem with Payments

Biró, Péter; Bomhoff, Matthijs; Golovach, Petr A.; … - 2012

v with pu+pv<w(uv). By pinpointing a relationship to the accessibility of the coalition structure core of matching games … is to find a stable solution. A solution is a matching M with a vector p.RV that satisfies pu+pv=w(uv) for all uv.M and … blocking value, respectively, are NP-complete. Finally, we prove that the first problem is NP-complete also when a matching is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494512

Endogenously Proportional Bargaining Solutions

Saglam, Ismail - 2012

This paper introduces a class of endogenously proportional bargaining solutions. These solutions are independent of the class of Directional solutions, which Chun and Thomson (1990a) proposed to generalize (exogenously) proportional solutions of Kalai (1977). Endogenously proportional solutions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010500229

On Axiomatizations of the Shapley Value for Assignment Games

Brink, René van den; Pintér, Miklós - 2012

We consider the problem of axiomatizing the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. We first show that several axiomatizations of the Shapley value on the class of all TU-games do not characterize this solution on the class of assignment games by providing alternative solutions that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014040150

Focused Power : Experimental Manifestation of the Shapley-Shubik Power Index

Geller, Chris; Mustard, Jamie - 2007

Experiments evaluate the fit of the Shapley-Shubik Power Index to a controlled human environment. Subjects with differing votes divide a fixed purse by majority rule in online chat rooms under supervision. Earnings serve as a measure of power. Chat rooms and processes for selecting subjects...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014222269

Learning from a Piece of Pie : The Empirical Content of Nash Bargaining

Chiappori, Pierre-André; Donni, Olivier - 2006

Consider a model of bargaining, in which two players, 1 and 2, share a pie of size y. The bargaining environment is described by a set a parameters λ that may affect agents' preferences over the agreement sharing, the status quo outcome, or both. The outcomes (i.e., whether an agreement is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014058235

A Comparison of NTU Values in a Cooperative Game with Incomplete Information

Salamanca, Andrés - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012907400

Chapter 55 Values of non-transferable utility games

McLean, Richard P. - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 2077-2120). 2002

This chapter surveys a class of solution concepts for n -person games without transferable utility — NTU games for short — that are based on varying notions of “fair division”. An NTU game is a specification of payoffs attainable by members of each coalition through some joint course of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024490

Endogenously proportional bargaining solutions

Sağlam, İsmail - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009656696

On axiomatizations of the Shapley value for assignment games

Brink, René van den; Pinter, Miklos - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009722981

Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks

Agbaglah, Messan; Ehlers, Lars H. - 2010

This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at equilibrium. We show the existence of subgame perfect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008737140