Similar Search Results

A Comparison of NTU Values in a Cooperative Game with Incomplete Information

Salamanca, Andrés - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012907400

Bargaining for Over-the-Counter Risk Redistributions : The Case of Longevity Risk

Boonen, Tim J. - 2017

Existing literature regarding the natural hedge potential that arises from combining liabilities with different sensitivities focuses on the optimal liability mix, but does not address the question whether and how changes in the liability mix can be obtained. In the absence of a well-functioning...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012974804

Endogenously proportional bargaining solutions

Sağlam, İsmail - 2012

This paper introduces a class of endogenously proportional bargaining solutions. These solutions are independent of the class of Directional solutions, which Chun and Thomson (1990a) proposed to generalize (exogenously) proportional solutions of Kalai (1977). Endogenously proportional solutions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009656696

Essentiality of degree r in cooperative games with transferable utility

Wang, Haoyu - 2021

-essential games, are shown to have a nonempty core. We give a recursive description of the core. Moreover, it is shown that the core …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013314021

Learning from a Piece of Pie : The Empirical Content of Nash Bargaining

Chiappori, Pierre-Andre; Donni, Olivier - 2021

Consider a model of bargaining, in which two players, 1 and 2, share a pie of size y. The bargaining environment is described by a set of parameters that may affect agents' preferences over the agreement sharing, the status quo outcome, or both. The outcomes (i.e., whether an agreement is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317590

Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation

Kilgour, Marc; Brams, Steven J. - 2009

Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners. We propose a procedure whereby they "fall back" on their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions. If there is more than one fallback coalition, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008810998

Negotiation across multiple issues

Gayer, Gabrielle; Persitz, Dotan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 3, pp. 937-969

problem, termed the multi-core, wherein an agent consents to participate in the grand coalition if she can envision a … cooperating with the grand coalition rather than operating alone. An allocation is in the multi-core if all agents consent to … participate in the grand coalition. We provide a theorem characterizing the non-emptiness of the multi-core and show that the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671885

Budget-balance, fairness and minimal manipulability

Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars H.; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 3, pp. 753-777

A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674186

Learning from a Piece of Pie : The Empirical Content of Nash Bargaining

Chiappori, Pierre-Andre; Donni, Olivier - 2006

Consider a model of bargaining, in which two players, 1 and 2, share a pie of size y. The bargaining environment is described by a set a parameters λ that may affect agents' preferences over the agreement sharing, the status quo outcome, or both. The outcomes (i.e., whether an agreement is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014058235

On the Sensitivity Matrix of the Nash Bargaining Solution

Engwerda, Jacob C.; Douven, Rudy - 2006

In this note we provide a characterization of a subclass of bargaining problems for which the Nash solution has the property of disagreement point monotonicity.While the original d-monotonicity axiom and its stronger notion, strong d-monotonicity, were introduced and discussed by Thomson [15],...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014065513