The paper considers a one-to-one matching with contracts model in the presence of price controls. This set-up contains … two important streams in the matching literature, those with and those without monetary transfers, as special cases and …

-empty subset of agents S if (a) no agent in S prefers the first matching to the second, and (b) no agent in S and his room-mate in … S under the second matching prefer each other to their respective room-mates in the first matching, then no room-mate of … an agent in S prefers the second matching to the first. This result is a strengthening of a result originally due to …

uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in …

Suppose that the agents of a matching market contact each other randomly and form new pairs if is in their interest …. Does such a process always converge to a stable matching if one exists? If so, how quickly? Are some stable matchings more …. The second part of the paper proposes new techniques to analyse the behaviour of matching markets. We introduce the Stable …

Many two-sided matching situations involve multiperiod interaction. Traditional cooperative solutions, such as … stability and the core, often identify unintuitive outcomes (or are empty) when applied to such markets. As an alternative, this … about the future and a robust evaluation of contemporaneous outcomes. A perfect a-stable matching exists, even when …

We consider the one-to-one two-sided matching with contracts model in which buyers face financial constraints. In this … equivalence among QCCE outcomes, stable outcomes, and core outcomes. We also analyze the existence of QCCEs with uniform prices …

it replaced. In this paper, we introduce a new framework for investigating school-choice matching problems and two ex …-to-many two-sided and one-sided matching models. We first show that the new NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness …

In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy …-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that …