We introduce a new matching model to mimic two-sided exchange programs such as tuition and worker exchange, in which …

Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed the deferred-acceptance algorithm for matching (i) college applicants and colleges and … always Pareto-optimal: No other matching is at least as good for all the players and better for one or more. If there are …

Scarf's algorithm [18] provides fractional core elements for NTU-games. Biró and Fleiner [3] showed that Scarf … the most important general stable matching problems due to its relevant applications, also wellknown to be NP-hard. We … show that if a stable allocation yielded by the Scarf algorithm turns outto be integral then it provides a stable matching …

In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy …-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that …

-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new …

-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new …

This paper considers marriage problems, roommate problems with nonempty core, and college admissions problems with …

We consider strategic issues in one-to-one matching with externalities. We show that no core (stable) mechanism is …

roommate problems having a non-empty core. Finally, we show that, if the core of a dominance invariant roommate problem is not … empty, it contains a unique matching, the dominance invariant stable matching, in which all agents who mutually top rank …