strongly balanced and the core is described by means of the cores of the underlying two-sided assignment games associated with … between core and competitive equilibria is established …

, the structure of an abstract market game is not strong enough to guarantee the nonemptiness of the core. We establish …

Solymosi and Raghavan (2001) characterize the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of … the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if …

Using a bi-choice graph technique (Klaus and Klijn, 2009), we show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly … dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this … von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable if and only if the matching is stable (Theorem 1). We also present roommate …

Using a bi-choice graph technique (Klaus and Klijn, 2009), we show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly … dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this … von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable if and only if the matching is stable (Theorem 1). We also present roommate …

We study a special three-sided matching game, the so-called supplier-firm-buyer game, in which buyers (customers) and …-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (Davis and …

We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise …-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The usual core may be empty. The setwise … parallels the standard theory of stability for many-to-one, and one-to-one, models. We provide results for a number of core …

. The core predicts a unique and extreme outcome: the entire surplus is split evenly among the buyers when m > n and among … the sellers when m < n; the long side gets nothing. We test this core conjecture in the lab with n + m = 3 or 5 randomly … agreements while trading. Despite frequent attempts to collude and occasional large deviations from the core prediction, we find …