(weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for …It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching markets, pair-wise stability is not logically related with the …-partner matching problem that includes two-sided matching problems as special cases. Under the same preference restriction, we also …

The paper considers a one-to-one matching with contracts model in the presence of price controls. This set-up contains … two important streams in the matching literature, those with and those without monetary transfers, as special cases and …

In many matching problems, it is natural to consider that agents may have preferences not only over the set of …

The paper considers a one-to-one matching with contracts model in the presence of price controls. This set-up contains … two important streams in the matching literature, those with and those without monetary transfers, as special cases and …

A coalitional matching is a two-sided matching problem in which agents on each side of the market may form coalitions … would like to learn from. In this setup, we examine how the existence of core stable partitions on the distinct market sides … respect common rankings shape the existence of core stable coalitional matchings. …

all men acceptable, Sasaki and Toda (1992) characterize the core by anonymity, Pareto optimality, consistency, and … by characterizing the core on the domain of no odd rings roommate markets by individual rationality, anonymity, Pareto …

In the marriage problem (two-sided one-to-one matching problem), it is well-known that the weak core, the strong core …-weak core and the G-strong core. These are core concepts in which blocking power is restricted to the coalitions belonging to … equivalence of the G-weak core and the G-strong core. -- marriage problem ; G-weak core ; G-strong core …

rotation model, in this paper we definea solution called the rotation core in the same flavor of the core in the housing … marketmodel. It turns out that the rotation core is nonempty, single-valued, and found by astrategy-proof variant of Top Trading … Cycle (TTC). This generalizes the well-knownresult that TTC finds the unique core allocation in the housing market model …

The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with private information is the (standard) core of a … incentive compatible core can be empty, even if utility functions are quasi-linear. If, in addition to quasi-linearity, further … assumptions are made (like independent private values), the non-emptiness of the core follows nevertheless from d'Aspremont and …