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The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in Exchange Economies With and Without Indivisibilities

Forges, Francoise - 2021

The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with private information is the (standard) core of a … incentive compatible core can be empty, even if utility functions are quasi-linear. If, in addition to quasi-linearity, further … assumptions are made (like independent private values), the non-emptiness of the core follows nevertheless from d'Aspremont and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317636

A cooperative value for Bayesian games

Kalai, Adam Taumann; Kalai, Ehud - 2010

Selfish, strategic players may benefit from cooperation, provided they reach agreement. It is therefore important to construct mechanisms that facilitate such cooperation, especially in the case of asymmetric private information. The two major issues are: (1) singling out a fair and efficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008665710

Partially Cooperative Games

Kawamori, Tomohiko - 2018

In this paper, we present a general model in which mutually dependent negotiations are simultaneously conducted and define a solution concept for the model. We provide a sufficient condition for the solution to exist and show that the solutions approximately coincide with the equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012930457

Cooperative strategic games

Kohlberg, Elon; Neyman, Abraham - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 3, pp. 825-851

The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value of a game is an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806287

On the Shapley value of liability games

Csóka, Péter; Illés, Ferenc; Solymosi, Tamás - 2020

In a liability problem, the asset value of an insolvent firm must be distributed among the creditors and the firm itself, when the firm has some freedom in negotiating with the creditors. We model the negotiations using cooperative game theory and analyze the Shapley value to resolve such...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012210861

On the Values of Bayesian Cooperative Games with Sidepayments

Salamanca, Andrés - 2018

In this paper we explore the relationship between several value-like solution concepts for cooperative games with incomplete information and utility transfers in the form of sidepayments. In our model, state-contingent contracts are required to be incentive compatible, and thus utility might not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012907404

A Generalization of the Harsanyi NTU Value to Games with Incomplete Information

Salamanca, Andrés - 2018

In this paper, we introduce a solution concept generalizing the Harsanyi non-transferable utility (NTU) value to cooperative games with incomplete information. The so-defined S-solution is characterized by virtual utility scales that extend the Harsanyi-Shapley fictitious weighted utility...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012907407

Externalities and Renegotiations in Three-Player Coalitional Bargaining

Gomes, Armando R. - 2004

This paper proposes a new solution concept to three-player coalitional bargaining problems. The coalitional bargaining problem is modeled as a dynamic non-cooperative game in which players make conditional or unconditional offers, coalitions continue to negotiate as long as there are gains from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014035050

Cooperative Strategic Games — Expanded Version

Kohlberg, Elon; Neyman, Abraham - 2021

The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value provides an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats against...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013242612

Stable Matching with Incomplete Information

Liu, Qingmin - 2013

We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013080181