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well-known that the strict core of such a game may be empty, single-valued, or multi-valued. We define a condition on such … core allocation in the model with no indifference). We prove that a game has a nonempty strict core if and only if it is … either a strict core allocation or a report that the strict core is empty. Finally, we are also able to construct a linear …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014084462
In the marriage problem (two-sided one-to-one matching problem), it is well-known that the weak core, the strong core …-weak core and the G-strong core. These are core concepts in which blocking power is restricted to the coalitions belonging to … equivalence of the G-weak core and the G-strong core. -- marriage problem ; G-weak core ; G-strong core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003321312
In the marriage problems (two-sided one-to-one matching problems), it is well-known that the weak core, the strong core …-weak core and the G-strong core. These are the core concepts in which blocking power is restricted to the coalitions belonging … of the G-weak core and the G-strong core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014059111
rotation model, in this paper we definea solution called the rotation core in the same flavor of the core in the housing … marketmodel. It turns out that the rotation core is nonempty, single-valued, and found by astrategy-proof variant of Top Trading … Cycle (TTC). This generalizes the well-knownresult that TTC finds the unique core allocation in the housing market model …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012836823
The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with private information is the (standard) core of a … incentive compatible core can be empty, even if utility functions are quasi-linear. If, in addition to quasi-linearity, further … assumptions are made (like independent private values), the non-emptiness of the core follows nevertheless from d'Aspremont and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317636
In this paper, we introduce a solution concept generalizing the Harsanyi non-transferable utility (NTU) value to cooperative games with incomplete information. The so-defined S-solution is characterized by virtual utility scales that extend the Harsanyi-Shapley fictitious weighted utility...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012907407
The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value provides an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats against...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013242612
This chapter surveys recent models of coalition and network formation in a unified framework. Comparisons are drawn among various procedures of network and coalition formation, involving simultaneous and sequential moves. The survey also covers models of group and network formation by farsighted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025687
This paper surveys some applications of cooperative game theory to supply chain management. Special emphasis is placed on two important aspects of cooperative games: profit allocation and stability. The paper first describes the construction of the set of feasible outcomes in commonly seen...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027101
Selfish, strategic players may benefit from cooperation, provided they reach agreement. It is therefore important to construct mechanisms that facilitate such cooperation, especially in the case of asymmetric private information. The two major issues are: (1) singling out a fair and efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008665710