In a multi-country general equilibrium economy with mobile capital and rigidwage unemployment, countries may differ in capital endowments, production technologies and rigid wages. Governments tax capital at the source to maximize national welfare. They account for tax base responses to their tax...

Tax competition for mobile capital can undermine the attempts of governments to redistribute income from rich to poor. I study whether international tax coordination can alleviate this problem, using a general equilibrium model synthesizing recent contributions to the tax competition literature....

Tax competition for mobile capital can undermine the attempts of governments to redistribute income from rich to poor. I study whether international tax coordination can alleviate this problem, using a general equilibrium model synthesizing recent contributions to the tax competition literature....

We examine international fiscal coordination in a world where markets are integrated but national governments are sovereign. Consequences of the liberalization of the capital market on national fiscal policies and possible remedies to resulting inefficiencies are analyzed. A simple model, with N...

The international exchange of tax information, and its merits compared to withholding taxes, is the central topic in current debates in international tax policy. The purpose of this paper is to characterize and compare the tax regimes that emerge with and without information exchange, under the...

Tax competition for mobile capital can undermine the attempts of governments to redistribute income from rich to poor. I study whether international tax coordination can alleviate this problem, using a general equilibrium model synthesizing recent contributions to the tax competition literature....

We consider tax competition in a world with tax bases exhibiting different degrees of mobility, modeled as mobile and immobile capital. An agreement among countries not to give preferential treatment to mobile capital results in an equilibrium where mobile capital is nevertheless taxed...

This paper provides a systematic analysis of the way shifts in property utilization rights in China induced another sequence of institutional changes that led to the rise of rural-urban labor migration from 1980 to 1984, a critical period in the country's market transition. I show that the...

Tax competition between independent authorities is known to lead to inefficient outcomes, implying there is scope for cooperation. In an international framework where the authorities are national governments, the undesirable features of tax competition may alternatively be mitigated by imposing...

This paper investigates the efficiency properties of tax competition between submetropolitan jurisdictions when capital, residents and workers are mobile, and both households and firms compete for local land markets. We analyze two decentralized equilibria: (1) with a local tax on residents and...