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Efficiency, Monotonicity and Rationality in Public Goods Economies

Gines, E.; Hurtado, Francisco Marhuenda - 1998

In economies with public goods, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of cost monotonic, Pareto optimal and individually rational mechanisms. These exist if and only if the preferences of the agents satisfy what we call the equal ordering property. We also show that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014215636

Separation of Powers, Political Competition and Efficient Provision of Public Goods

Boukouras, Aristotelis; Koufopoulos, Kostas - 2010

In this paper we provide a political game where agents decide whether to become legislators or politicians. Legislators determine the political institutions constraining politicians' behavior and politicians compete for gaining the power to make decisions about the level of the public good. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014208460

The conditional contribution mechanism for repeated public goods: The general case

Oechssler, Joerg; Reischmann, Andreas; Sofianos, Andis - 2019

We present a new and simple mechanism for repeated public good environments. In the Conditional Contribution Mechanism … contributed." This mechanism offers agents risk-free strategies, which we call unexploitable. We prove that if agents choose … Contribution Mechanism show that the CCM leads to significantly higher contribution rates. Even under incomplete information …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012109314

All or Nothing: State Capacity and Optimal Public Goods Provision

Bierbrauer, Felix; Winkelmann, Justus - 2018

.e. resources to pay for all the public goods in the bundle. The analysis focuses on the all-or-nothing-mechanism: Expand provision … all-outcome converges to one as the capacity becomes unbounded. We also provide conditions under which the all-or-nothing-mechanism …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011931988

Optimal Income Taxation and Public-Goods Provision with Preference and Productivity Shocks

Bierbrauer, Felix - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2010

shocks. A conventional Mirrleesian treatment is shown to provoke manipulations of the policy mechanism by individuals with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008462293

The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and Large Number of Agents

Behringer, Stefan - 2005

This paper provides a limit result for the provision of a public good in a mechanism design framework as the number of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005455480

An Incomplete Contract Perspective on Public Good Provision

Martimort, David - 2016

This paper surveys what can be learned from recent advances in the incomplete contract literature to understand how public goods are or should be provided. The paper starts with a section on the full information case that presents and discusses the classical Samuelson condition on the optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012747610

Incomplete contracts and excludable public goods

Bierbrauer, Felix - In: Journal of public economics 95 (2011) 7/8, pp. 553-569

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009270573

Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents

Gizatulina, Alia; Hellwig, Martin - 2009

small because there are many other agents who have information about them. -- surplus extraction ; mechanism design ; BDP …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003877136

The benefit of anonymity in public goods games

Hugh-Jones, David; Reinstein, David - 2010

Previous work has found that in social dilemmas, the selfish always free-ride, while others will cooperate if they expect their peers to do so as well. Outcomes may thus depend on conditional cooperators’ beliefs about the number of selfish types. An early round of the game may be played...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003955221