mechanism of d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet is shown to implement an effi cient provision rule with budget balance. However, first … mechanism is independent of the stochastic specification within the class of specifications defined by the structure of the …-Groves mechanism converges to zero in probability when the number of participants becomes large. In the limit, with a continuum of …

mechanism of d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet is shown to implement an efficient provision rule with budget balance. However, first … mechanism is independent of the stochastic specification within the class of specifications defined by the structure of the …-Groves mechanism converges to zero in probability when the number of participants becomes large. In the limit, with a continuum of …

form a reasonable set of predictions for mechanism selection in public goods problems; such predictions are sufficiently …

on a mechanism design approach that involves a requirement of coalition-proofness, as well as a requirement of robustness …, so that the mechanism must not depend on specific assumptions about individual beliefs. Our main result shows that such a … mechanism can condition only on the population shares of people with valuations above and below the per capita provision costs …

preferences for public goods. A mechanism design approach is used to characterize implementable tax and expenditure policies. A …

We consider a revelation mechanism for the production of public goods. A sample of consumers is drawn at random. Each … surplus of taxes collected on sampled agents is redistributed to non-sampled agents. This polling mechanism is non … to a public good with exclusion, this mechanism, in combination with consumer free mobility, yields approximately optimal …