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Procedural group identification
Dimitrov, Dinko; Sung, Shao Chin; Xu, Yongsheng - Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, … - 2006
In this paper we axiomatically characterize two recursive procedures for defining a social group. The first procedure … of the second procedure is the set of all individuals who define themselves as members of the social group. Both …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005002274
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Procedural group identification
Dimitrov, Dinko (contributor); Sung, Shao Chin (contributor) - 2006
corresponding initial set, and continue inductively until there is no possibility of expansion any more. -- Consensus ; Liberalism …In this paper we axiomatically characterize two recursive procedures for defining a social group. The first procedure … of the second procedure is the set of all individuals who define themselves as members of the social group. Both …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003731221
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Procedural Group Identification
Dimitrov, Dinko; Sung, Shao Chin; Xu, Yongsheng - 2004
In this paper we axiomatically characterize two recursive procedures for defining a social group. The first procedure … second procedure is the set of all individuals who are defined by everyone in the society as group members. Both procedures …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014071563
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Minimal Liberties, Maximal State and the Market : The Case for a Coasian Liberal
Nicita, Antonio - 2003
The paper compares the Sen's paradox on the Paretian liberal (1970) and the standard version of the Coase theorem (1960). The comparison of the two theorems is somehow puzzling: If we accept Sen then we have to forget Coase and vice-versa. Following the analysis of Hillinger and Lapham (1971),...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014103775
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Procedurally fair provision of public projects: An axiomatic characterization
Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut - 2011
Unanimous voting as the fundamental procedural source of political legitimacy grants veto power to each individual. We present an axiomatic characterization of a class of bidding processes to spell out the underlying egalitarian values for collective projects of a productive state. At heart of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286454
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Fair collective choice rules: Their origin and relationship
Nishimura, Yukihiro - 2008
This paper provides a conceptual framework on fair collective choice rules that synthesizes the studies of Goldman and Sussangkarn (1978) and Suzumura (1981) on the one hand and Tadenuma (2002, 2005) on the other. We show that both frameworks have the following binary relation as a common...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010290399
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Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
Fujinaka, Yuji; Wakayama, Takuma - 2009 - Rev.
This paper considers the object allocation problem introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). We study secure implementation (Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2007), that is, double implementation in dominant strategy and Nash equilibria. We prove that (i) an individually rational solution is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003819988
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Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems
Ansink, Erik; Weikard, Hans-Peter - 2009
We analyse the redistribution of a resource among agents who have claims to the resource and who are ordered linearly. A well known example of this particular situation is the river sharing problem. We exploit the linear order of agents to transform the river sharing problem to a sequence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008840051
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Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money
Fujinaka, Yuji (contributor); Wakayama, Takuma (contributor) - 2007
This paper studies the application of the notion of secure implementation (Cason, Saijo, Sj¨ostr¨om, and Yamato, 2006; Saijo, Sj¨ostr¨om, and Yamato, 2007) to the problem of allocating indivisible objects with monetary transfers. We propose a new domain-richness condition, termed as minimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003556299
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Procedurally fair provision of public projects : an axiomatic characterization
Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut - 2011
Unanimous voting as the fundamental procedural source of political legitimacy grants veto power to each individual. We present an axiomatic characterization of a class of bidding processes to spell out the underlying egalitarian values for collective projects of a "productive state". At heart of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008990916