We propose the minimum approval mechanism (MAM) for a standard linear public good environment with two players. Players simultaneously and privately choose their contributions to the public good in the first stage. In the second stage, they simultaneously decide whether to approve the other’s...

We consider two alternatives to inaction for governments combating terrorism, which we term Deterrence and Prevention. Deterrence – investing in resources that reduce the impact of an attack – generates a negative externality to other governments, making their countries a more attractive...

We provide an overview of experimental literature on lottery contests and point out the two main phenomena observed in most contest experiments: overbidding relative to the standard Nash equilibrium prediction and heterogeneous behavior of ex-ante symmetric contestants. Based on the sample of...

This study uses a controlled laboratory experiment to analyze the effects of conflict on economic growth and development. Participants were given control of a small, virtual civilization and provided incentives to develop their civilization under various conflict scenarios. The findings suggest...

Social dilemmas are central to human society. Depletion of natural resources, climate protection, security of energy supply, and workplace collaborations are all examples of social dilemmas. Since cooperative behaviour in a social dilemma is individually costly, Nash equilibrium predicts that...

Understanding norms of fairness is essential for explaining many phenomena in organizations. Using a dictator game, we examine the behavior of individuals who are given the responsibility of individually making an allocation decision on behalf of a two-person group in a dictator game without...

When participants do not expect that a conflict will be resolved by direct negotiation, they may ask a third party to intervene in the conflicts. In Japan, the civil trial has been the sole social institution of third party intervention which disputants can use for difficult conflicts. In a...

We experimentally investigate how firms and consumers react to a sudden cost increase in a competitive retail market. We compare two conditions which exclusively differ with respect to how difficult it is to organize and enforce boycotts. We find that cost increases translate into sudden price...

Formal models in political science typically consider actors with differing interests or ideologies, but political actors often have “good faith disagreements” about how to achieve commonly shared goals. We develop a model of a hierarchical political organization in which a principal and an...