We consider a public firm characterized by a moral hazard problem. A distinguished player is a CEO or activist shareholder who (i) is unrestricted to trade shares and (ii) has discretion to increase the value of this firm by exerting costly effort. Von Lilienfeld-Toal and Ru ̈nzi (2014)...

It is generally presumed that strengthening the legal enforcement of lender rights increases credit access for all borrowers, by expanding the set of incentive-compatible loan contracts. This presumption is based on an implicit assumption of infinitely elastic supply of loans. With inelastic...

It is generally presumed that strengthening legal enforcement of lender rights increases credit access for all borrowers, by expanding the set of incentive compatible loan contracts. This is based on an implicit assumption of infinitely elastic supply of loans. With inelastic supply,...

Suppose the value of a ¯rm is endogenously determined by a manager\'s costly e®ort. We call this manager a distinguished player if he also can trade shares of the ¯rm on a market. Arbitrage-free asset pricing theory suggests that the equilibrium market price re°ects the value increasing...

What are the effects of restricting bonded labor clauses in tenancy or debt contracts? While such restrictions reduce agents' ability to credibly commit ex ante to repay principals in states where they default on their financial obligations, they also generate a pecuniary externality on other...

Should the law restrict liability of defaulting borrowers? We abstract from possible benefits arising from limited rationality or risk-aversion of borrowers, contractual incompleteness, or lender moral hazard. We focus instead on general equilibrium implications of liability rules with moral...

Most analyses of the recent ¯nancial crisis in the US focus on the consequences of the dramatic slump in housing prices that started in the mid-2000s, which led to rising mortgage defaults, shrinking home equity credit and liquidity in the banking system. Yet these accounts do not explain what...

It is generally presumed that stronger legal enforcement of lender rights increases credit access for all borrowers because it expands the set of incentive compatible loan contracts. This result relies on an assumption that the supply of credit is innitely elastic. In contrast, with inelastic...

Should the law restrict liability of defaulting borrowers? We abstract from possible benefits arising from limited rationality or risk-aversion of borrowers, contractual incompleteness, or lender moral hazard. We focus instead on general equilibrium implications of liability rules with moral...