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Unemployment insurance recipients in the Netherlands were for a long time exempted from the requirement to actively search for a job when they reached the age of 57.5. We study how this exemption affected the job finding rates of the recipients involved. We find evidence that the job finding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013081809
Unemployment insurance recipients in the Netherlands were for a long time exempted from the requirement to actively search for a job when they reached the age of 57.5. We study how this exemption affected the job finding rates of the recipients involved. We find evidence that the job finding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014157735
Unemployment insurance recipients in the Netherlands were for a long time exempted from the requirement to actively search for a job when they reached the age of 57.5. We study how this exemption affected the job finding rates of the recipients involved. We find evidence that the job finding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014158095
Ein Instrument zur Eindämmung von Moral Hazard in der Arbeitslosenversicherung ist die finanzielle Sanktion in Form … Vermittlungsvorschlägen und Sperrzeiten auf die Dauer der Arbeitslosigkeit und die Qualität der aufgenommenen Jobs.Wir schätzen Multi … auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Krankmeldung. Dieser Effekt ist geringer in späteren Monaten der Arbeitslosigkeit. Dies …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011418245
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011449662
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex-ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011414725
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011635521
This paper analyzes the impact of the Austrian Regional Extended Benefit Program (REBP) on the labor market outcomes for elderly workers in Austria. The REBP extended entitlement to regular unemployment benefits from 30 weeks to a maximum of 209 weeks for elderly individuals in certain regions....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409442
Does a drastic cut in in potential benefit duration affect the take-up of unemployment insurance benefits among those eligible? We evaluate a policy change reducing the maximum length of UI benefits from 9 to 3 months in Hungary at the end of 2011. We rely on rich longitudinal matched...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014488985
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex-ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013000204