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Field Experiments with Firms
Bandiera, Oriana; Barankay, Iwan; Rasul, Imran - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
. We present insights from two classes of experiments: within and across firms, and draw common lessons from both sets …. Field experiments within firms generally aim to shed light on the nature of agency problems. Along these lines, we discuss …-monetary incentives. Field experiments across firms generally aim to uncover firms' binding constraints by exogenously varying the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009493556
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Field Experiments with Firms
Bandiera, Oriana; Barankay, Iwan; Rasul, Imran - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011
. We present insights from two classes of experiments: within and across firms, and draw common lessons from both sets …. Field experiments within firms generally aim to shed light on the nature of agency problems. Along these lines, we discuss …-monetary incentives. Field experiments across firms generally aim to uncover firms' binding constraints by exogenously varying the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009024598
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Field Experiments with Firms
Bandiera, Oriana; Baranky, Iwan; Rasul, Imran - Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics … - 2011
. We present insights from two classes of experiments: within and across firms, and draw common lessons from both sets …. Field experiments within firms generally aim to shed light on the nature of agency problems. Along these lines, we discuss …-monetary incentives. Field experiments across firms generally aim to uncover firms' binding constraints by exogenously varying the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009209861
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Legitimacy of Control
Schnedler, Wendelin; Vadovic, Radovan - 2007
What is the motivational effect of imposing a minimum effort require- ment? Agents may no longer exert voluntary effort but merely meet the requirement. Here, we examine how such hidden costs of control change when control is considered legitimate. We study a principal- agent model where control...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422159
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Relative Performance Pay in the Shadow of Crisis
Kräkel, Matthias; Nieken, Petra - 2013
We analyze whether incentives from relative performance pay are reduced or enhanced if a department is possibly terminated due to a crisis. Our benchmark model shows that incentives decrease in a severe crisis, but are boosted given a minor crisis since efforts are strategic complements in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333837
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Playing 'Hard to Get': An Economic Rationale for Crowding Out of Intrinsically Motivated Behavior
Schnedler, Wendelin; Vanberg, Christoph - 2014
Anecdotal, empirical, and experimental evidence suggests that offering extrinsic rewards for certain activities can reduce people's willingness to engage in those activities voluntarily. We propose a simple rationale for this 'crowding out' phenomenon, using standard economic arguments. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010352283
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Trust, trustworthiness and selection into the financial industry
Gill, Andrej; Heinz, Matthias; Schumacher, Heiner - 2014
We examine trust and trustworthiness of individuals with varying professional preferences and experiences. Our subjects study business and economics in Frankfurt, the financial center of Germany and continental Europe. In the trust game, subjects with a high interest in working in the financial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010368430
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Can lab experiments help design personnel policies?
Villeval, Marie Claire - In: IZA World of Labor (2016)
Can a company attract a different type of employee by changing its compensation scheme? Is it sufficient to pay more to increase employees’ motivation? Should a firm provide evaluation feedback to employees based on their absolute or their relative performance? Laboratory experiments can help...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011573707
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Distrust : The Hidden Cost of Control
Falk, Armin; Kosfeld, Michael - 2004
We show experimentally that a principal?s distrust in the voluntary performance of an agent has a negative impact on the agent?s motivation to perform well. Before the agent chooses his performance, the principal in our experiment decides whether he wants to restrict the agents? choice set by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261958
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Positive and Negative Team Identity in a Promotion Game
Eberlein, Marion; Walkowitz, Gari - 2008
In this paper we experimentally investigate whether the so-called in-group/out-group bias leads to a favoring of own team members as candidates in promotion (by voting for them) relative to other teams and their members. In contrast to psychological approaches, mon- etary incentives for voting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264923