We study a two-sided market where a platform attracts firms selling differentiated products and buyers interested in those products. In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, the platform fully internalizes the network externalities present in the market and firms and consumers all...

We study a two-sided market where a platform attracts firms selling differentiated products and buyers interested in those products. In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, the platform fully internalizes the network externalities present in the market and firms and consumers all...

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the <A href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292108000810">European Economic Review</A>.<p>We study a two-sided market where a platform attracts firms selling differentiated products and buyers interested in those products. In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, the platform fully...</p></a>

This paper compares the equilibrium outcomes in search markets with and without referrals. Although it seems clear that consumers would benefit from referrals, it is not at all clear whether firms would unilaterally provide information about competing offers since such information could...

This paper compares the equilibrium outcomes in search markets with and without referrals. Although it seems clear that consumers would benefit from referrals, it is not at all clear whether firms would unilaterally provide information about competing offers since such information could...

To reduce the competition from farmers who self-produce seed, an inbred line seed producercan switch to nondurable hybrid seed. In a two-period model we investigate the impactof crop durability on self-production, pricing and switching decisions, and we examine theimpact of license fees paid by...