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Agglomeration, Segregation, and Social Welfare in Group Formation Games

Loeper, Antoine - 2016

We consider a non cooperative game in which a continuum of heterogeneous individuals partition themselves into groups. A player's payoff depends on the group she chooses and the set of players who choose the same group as her.In the case of anonymous group externalities, we show that free...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012981998

Accepting the newcomer : do information and voting shape cooperation within groups?

Baier, Alexandra; Struwe, Natalie - 2024 - This version: October 30, 2024

We study cooperation in an environment where public good providers face the decision to accept a newcomer to their group. A bottom-up process for accepting new members to social groups reveals individual preferences to include newcomers. Alternatively, inclusion can be decided in a top-down...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015125373

Is Experimentation Invariant to Group Size? A Laboratory Analysis of Innovation Contests

Hudja, Stanton - 2020

This paper uses a laboratory experiment to investigate the role of group size in an innovation contest. Subjects compete in a discrete time innovation contest, based on Halac, Kartik, and Liu (2017), where subjects, at the start of each period, are informed of the aggregate number of innovation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014103431

The Collective Action Problem : Within-group Cooperation and Between-group Competition in a Repeated Rent-Seeking Game

Cheikbossian, Guillaume - 2008

This paper analyzes the ability of group members to cooperate in rent-seeking in a context of between-group competition. For this purpose, we develop an infinitely repeated rent-seeking model with two groups where within-group cooperation is supported through the use of a double-edged trigger...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014219131

Organizing for Collective Action : Olson Revisited

Battaglini, Marco; Palfrey, Thomas R. - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2023

We study a standard collective action problem in which successful achievement of a group interest requires costly participation by some fraction of its members. How should we model the internal organization of these groups when there is asymmetric information about the preferences of their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014226188

The economics of altruistic punishment and the demise of cooperation

Egas, Martijn; Riedl, Arno - 2005

Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and the social sciences. Recent experimental evidence suggests that altruistic punishment is an important mechanism to maintain cooperation among humans. In this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011343948

Can Endogenous Group Formation Prevent Coordination Failure? A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation

Raab, Philippe - 2021

This paper studies the effect of endogenous group formation on the outcome in two types of coordination games with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria. Endogenous group formation means that in each period players are free to choose among two or more groups within which they want to play the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318480

The Effect of Intergroup Competition on Group Coordination : An Experimental Study

Bornstein, Gary; Genîzî, Ûrî; Nagel, Rosemarie - 2000

We report an experiment on the effect of intergroup competition on group coordination in the minimal-effort game (Van Huyck et al., 1990). The competition was between two 7-person groups. Each player in each group independently chose an integer from 1 to 7. The group with the higher minimum won...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014043053

Group contests with internal conflict and power asymmetry

Choi, Jay Pil; Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Kim, Jaesoo - 2014

We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the same time engage in contest with fellow group members to appropriate the possible reward. We introduce within group power asymmetry and complementarity in members'efforts, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010467392

Under-connected and over-connected networks

Buechel, Berno; Hellmann, Tim - 2008

Since the seminal contribution of Jackson & Wolinsky 1996 [A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, JET 71 …, 44-74] it has been widely acknowledged that the formation of social networks exhibits a general conflict between … results that relate situations of positive externalities with stable networks that cannot be 'too dense' in a well …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272547