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Exploring Group Cooperation in the Provision of Public Goods

Zetland, David - 2017

A novel version of a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism game tests how player cooperation responds to changes in incentives, i.e., payoffs that depend on performance relative to different reference groups. Cooperation is greatest when players are competing against players in other four-person...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014223953

Organizing for Collective Action : Olson Revisited

Battaglini, Marco; Palfrey, Thomas R. - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2023

We study a standard collective action problem in which successful achievement of a group interest requires costly participation by some fraction of its members. How should we model the internal organization of these groups when there is asymmetric information about the preferences of their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014226188

Is Experimentation Invariant to Group Size? A Laboratory Analysis of Innovation Contests

Hudja, Stanton - 2020

This paper uses a laboratory experiment to investigate the role of group size in an innovation contest. Subjects compete in a discrete time innovation contest, based on Halac, Kartik, and Liu (2017), where subjects, at the start of each period, are informed of the aggregate number of innovation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014103431

Choosing the carrot or the stick? : endogenous institutional choice in social dilemma situations

Sutter, Matthias; Haigner, Stefan; Kocher, Martin - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003738422

Carrot or stick? : group selection and the evolution of reciprocal preferences

Herold, Florian - 2003 - This version: July 2, 2003

This paper studies the evolution of both characteristics of reciprocity - the willingness to reward friendly behavior and the willingness to punish hostile behavior. Firstly, preferences for rewarding as well as preferences for punishing can survive evolution provided individuals interact within...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010440934

The Formation of Networks with Transfers among Players

Jackson, Matthew O.; Bloch, Francis - 2004

We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network. We … links. We characterize the networks that are supported under these variations and show how each of the above aspects is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324957

Under-connected and over-connected networks

Buechel, Berno; Hellmann, Tim - 2008

Since the seminal contribution of Jackson & Wolinsky 1996 [A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, JET 71 …, 44-74] it has been widely acknowledged that the formation of social networks exhibits a general conflict between … results that relate situations of positive externalities with stable networks that cannot be 'too dense' in a well …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272547

Convexity and complementarity in network formation: Implications for the structure of pairwise stable networks

Hellmann, Tim - 2009

and the implications for the structure of pairwise stable networks. First, different definitions of convexity (concavity … own links and strategic complements, a local uniqueness property of pairwise stable networks is derived. The results do …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272600

Local and global pollution and international environmental agreements in a network approach

Günther, Michael; Hellmann, Tim - 2015

Increasing concerns about climate change have given rise to the formation of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) as a possible solution to limit global pollution effects. In this paper, we study the stability of IEAs in a repeated game framework where we restrict to strategies which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011332824

One-way flow networks : the role of heterogeneity

Galeotti, Andrea - 2004

I study a one-way flow connections model in which players are heterogeneous with respect to values and the costs of establishing a link. I first show that values and costs asymmetries are crucial in determining the level of connectedness of a network. Interestingly, unconnected equilibria are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334833