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Prize Sharing Rules in Collective Contests : When Does Group Size Matter?

Gupta, Dhritiman - 2020

In this paper we deal with situations of collective contests between two groups over a private prize. A well known way to divide the prize within the winning group is the prize sharing rule introduced by Nitzan, 1991. Since its introduction it has become a standard in the collective contests...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012827736

The creation of social norms under weak institutions

Diekert, Florian; Eymess, Tillmann; Luomba, Joseph; … - 2020

Preventing overﬁshing at Lake Victoria is a typical situation where policies have to rely on norm-based interventions to improve outcomes. Our lab-in-the-ﬁeld experiment studies how information about high or low levels of previous cooperation affects the creation of social norms in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012214929

Contests within and between groups

Bhattacharya, Puja; Rampal, Jeevant - 2019

This paper examines behavior (the oretically and experimentally) in a two-stage group contest where the fi rst stage comprises of intra - group contests, followed by an inter-group contest in the second stage. Rewards accrue only to the members of the winning group in the inter-group contest,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012014361

The demand for punishment to promote cooperation among like-minded people

Bühren, Christoph; Dannenberg, Astrid - 2020

We use an experiment to test the hypothesis that groups consisting of like-minded cooperators are able to cooperate irrespective of punishment and therefore have a lower demand for a costly punishment institution than groups of like-minded free riders, who are unable to cooperate without...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012542999

Can Endogenous Group Formation Prevent Coordination Failure? A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation

Raab, Philippe - 2021

This paper studies the effect of endogenous group formation on the outcome in two types of coordination games with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria. Endogenous group formation means that in each period players are free to choose among two or more groups within which they want to play the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318480

Accepting the newcomer : do information and voting shape cooperation within groups?

Baier, Alexandra; Struwe, Natalie - 2024 - This version: October 30, 2024

We study cooperation in an environment where public good providers face the decision to accept a newcomer to their group. A bottom-up process for accepting new members to social groups reveals individual preferences to include newcomers. Alternatively, inclusion can be decided in a top-down...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015125373

Organizing for Collective Action : Olson Revisited

Battaglini, Marco; Palfrey, Thomas R. - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2023

We study a standard collective action problem in which successful achievement of a group interest requires costly participation by some fraction of its members. How should we model the internal organization of these groups when there is asymmetric information about the preferences of their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014226188

Group Size and Collective Action in a Binary Contribution Game

Nöldeke, Georg - 2020

We consider how group size affects the private provision of a public good with non-refundable binary contributions. A fixed amount of the good is provided if and only if the number of contributors reaches an exogenous threshold. The threshold, the group size, and the identical, non-refundable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012850760

The Collective Action Problem : Within-group Cooperation and Between-group Competition in a Repeated Rent-Seeking Game

Cheikbossian, Guillaume - 2008

This paper analyzes the ability of group members to cooperate in rent-seeking in a context of between-group competition. For this purpose, we develop an infinitely repeated rent-seeking model with two groups where within-group cooperation is supported through the use of a double-edged trigger...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014219131

Under-connected and over-connected networks

Buechel, Berno; Hellmann, Tim - 2008

Since the seminal contribution of Jackson & Wolinsky 1996 [A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, JET 71 …, 44-74] it has been widely acknowledged that the formation of social networks exhibits a general conflict between … results that relate situations of positive externalities with stable networks that cannot be 'too dense' in a well …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272547