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Optimal Mechanisms for an Auction Mediator
Matros, Alexander; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy - School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary - 2010
mediator has incomplete information about traders' values and selects an auction mechanism to maximize her expected revenue. We … characterize mediator-optimal mechanisms and show that an optimal mechanism has a simple implementation as a Vickrey auction with a … reserve price where the seller pays to the mediator only a fixed percentage from the closing price. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008492111
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Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator
Matros, Alexander; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy - 2010
mediator has incomplete information about traders' values and selects an auction mechanism to maximize her expected revenue. We … characterize mediator-optimal mechanisms and show that an optimal mechanism has a simple implementation as a Vickrey auction with a … reserve price where the seller pays to the mediator only a fixed percentage from the closing price. -- Optimal mechanism …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008659956
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Ex-post regret learning in games with fixed and random matching : the case of private values
Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2010
In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to understand how to play games of incomplete information under private values. The conclusions depend on whether players interact within a fixed set (fixed matching) or they are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008688967
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Ex-Post Regret Learning in Games with Fixed and Random Matching : The Case of Private Values
Saran, Rene - 2010
In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to understand how to play games of incomplete information under private values. The conclusions depend on whether players interact within a fixed set (fixed matching) or they are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142432
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Competing Auction Houses
Matros, Alexander; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy - Kyiv School of Economics - 2009
We consider a model where sellers make repeated attempts to sell an object via two competing auction houses. An auction house that attracts a seller runs a Vickrey auction among a random sample of buyers and collects two fees: a listing fee and, if the object is sold, a closing fee. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970829
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Sequential bargaining with pure common values
Schweinzer, Paul - 2006
We study the alternating-offers bargaining problem of assigning an indivisible and commonly valued object to one of two players in return for some payment among players. The players are asymmetrically informed about the object's value and have veto power over any settlement. There is no...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373492
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Sequential bargaining with pure common values and incomplete information on both sides
Schweinzer, Paul - 2006
We study the alternating-offer bargaining problem of sharing a common value pie under incomplete information on both sides and no depreciation between two identical players. We characterise the essentially unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game which turns out to be in gradually...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373493
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Dynamic Auctions : A Survey
Bergemann, Dirk - 2010
We survey the recent literature on designing auctions and mechanisms for dynamic settings. Two settings are considered: those with a dynamic population of agents or buyers whose private information remains fixed throughout time; and those with a fixed population of agents or buyers whose private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013146386
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Auctions, actions, and the failure of information aggregation
Atakan, Alp; Ekmekci, Mehmet - 2012
We study a market in which k identical and indivisible objects are allocated using a uniform-price auction where n k bidders each demand one object. Before the auction, each bidder receives an informative but imperfect signal about the state of the world. The good that is auctioned is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009632293
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Informational hold up and intermediaries
Utgoff, Naomi - In: Games 13 (2022) 5, pp. 1-14
Why do some incomplete information markets feature intermediaries while others do not? I study the allocation of two goods in an incomplete information setting with a single principal, multiple agents with unit demand, and interdependent valuations. I construct a novel dynamic mechanism...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418049