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Information and beliefs in a repeated normal-form game
Fehr, Dietmar; Kübler, Dorothea; Danz, David - 2008
We study beliefs and choices in a repeated normal-form game. In addition to a baseline treatment with common knowledge … its development over time. We use belief statements to track the consistency of subjects.actions and beliefs as well as … the accuracy of their beliefs (relative to the opponent.s true choice) over time. In the baseline treatment we observe …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263726
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Information and Beliefs in a Repeated Normal-Form Game
Fehr, Dietmar; Kübler, Dorothea; Danz, David N. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008
feedback as the main driving force of learning to play strategically and to form beliefs that accurately predict the behavior …We study beliefs and choices in a repeated normal-form game. In addition to a baseline treatment with common knowledge … beliefs as well as for the accuracy of their beliefs (relative to the opponent’s true choice). In the baseline treatment we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822932
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Information and Beliefs in a Repeated Normal-form Game
Fehr, Dietmar; Kübler, Dorothea; Danz, David - Sonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko, … - 2008
We study beliefs and choices in a repeated normal-form game. In addition to a baseline treatment with common knowledge … its development over time. We use belief statements to track the consistency of subjects' actions and beliefs as well as … the accuracy of their beliefs (relative to the opponent's true choice) over time. In the baseline treatment we observe …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005678017
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Information and beliefs in a repeated normal-form game
Fehr, Dietmar; Kübler, Dorothea; Danz, David - 2008
feedback as the main driving force of learning to play strategically and to form beliefs that accurately predict the behavior …We study beliefs and choices in a repeated normal-form game. In addition to a baseline treatment with common knowledge … beliefs as well as for the accuracy of their beliefs (relative to the opponent's true choice). In the baseline treatment we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268780
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Strategic Play and Risk Aversion in One-Shot Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study
Ivanov, Asen - Department of Economics, School of Business
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004982313
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Attitudes to Ambiguity in One-Shot Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study
Ivanov, Asen - Department of Economics, School of Business - 2009
Based on an experiment in the lab, we classify behavior in one-shot normal-form games along three important dimensions. The first dimension, which is of main interest, is about whether subjects are ambiguity-loving, ambiguity-neutral, or ambiguity-averse. The second dimension is about whether...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004982314
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The Power of Sunspots: An Experimental Analysis
Heinemann, Frank; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Fehr, Dietmar - 2011
We present an experiment in which extrinsic signals may generate sunspot equilibria. The game has a unique symmetric non-sunspot equilibrium, which is also risk dominant. Other equilibria can be ordered according to risk dominance. By comparing treatments with different information structure, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010305959
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The power of sunspots: An experimental analysis
Fehr, Dietmar; Heinemann, Frank; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol - 2011
We present an experiment in which extrinsic information (signals) may generate sunspot equilibria. The underlying coordination game has a unique symmetric non-sunspot equilibrium, which is also risk-dominant. Other equilibria can be ordered according to risk dominance. We introduce salient but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286691
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The Power of Sunspots: An Experimental Analysis
Heinemann, Frank; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Fehr, Dietmar - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2011
We present an experiment in which extrinsic signals may generate sunspot equilibria. The game has a unique symmetric non-sunspot equilibrium, which is also risk dominant. Other equilibria can be ordered according to risk dominance. By comparing treatments with different information structure, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010957267
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The Power of Sunspots: An Experimental Analysis
Fehr, Dietmar; Heinemann, Frank; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2011
We present an experiment in which extrinsic information (signals) may generate sunspot equilibria. The underlying coordination game has a unique symmetric non-sunspot equilibrium, which is also risk-dominant. Other equilibria can be ordered according to risk dominance. We introduce salient but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010535927