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Bargaining over managerial contracts in delegation games : managerial power, contract disclosure and cartel behavior

Witteloostuijn, Arjen van; Jansen, Thijs; Lier, Arie van - In: Managerial and decision economics : MDE ; the … 28 (2007) 8, pp. 897-904

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003611781

Optimal long-term financial contracting

DeMarzo, Peter M.; Fishman, Michael J. - In: The review of financial studies 20 (2007) 6, pp. 2079-2128

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003621429

Contract federalism

Spahn, Paul Bernd - In: Handbook of fiscal federalism, (pp. 182-197). 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003381889

Performance contracts with state-owned enterprises

Mallon, Richard D. - 1983

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003525935

A note on long-term contracts

Ito, Takatoshi - 1984

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003530883

Specificity revisited : the role of cross-investments

Ellman, Matthew - In: The journal of law, economics, & organization 22 (2006) 1, pp. 234-257

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003300902

Contracting with an urgent supplier under cost information asymmetry

Xu, He; Shi, Ning; Ma, Shi-hua; Lai, Kin Keung - In: European journal of operational research : EJOR 206 (2010) 2, pp. 374-383

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003983355

Benefits and uncertainties of performance-based contracting in manufacturing industries : an agency theory perspective

Hypko, Phillipp; Tilebein, Meike; Gleich, Ronald - In: Journal of service management 21 (2010) 4, pp. 460-489

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008656291

To reward the best or to punish the worst? : a comparison of two tournament mechanisms with heterogeneous agents

Balafoutas, Loukas; Dutcher, Glenn; Lindner, Florian; … - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009571175

The benefits of sequential screening

Krähmer, Daniel; Strausz, Roland - 2011 - First version: October 12, 2011, This version: October 12, 2011

This paper considers the canonical sequential screening model and shows that when the agent has an expost outside option, the principal does not benefit from eliciting the agent's information sequentially. Unlike in the standard model without expost outside options, the optimal contract is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009381855