This paper analyses possible options how to improve the risk adjustment of the health insurance system in the Czech Republic. From the possible options it argues for including pharmaceutical cost groups (PCGs) as additional risk factors since it is an improvement that can be implemented almost...

This paper analyses possible options how to improve the risk adjustment of the health insurance system in the Czech Republic. Out of possible options it argues for including Pharmaceutical Cost Groups (PCGs) as additional risk factors since it is an improvement that can be implemented almost...

In two important recent papers, Finkelstein and McGarry [25] and Finkelstein and Poterba [28] propose a new test for asymmetric information in insurance markets that considers explicitly unobserved heterogeneity in insurance demand. In this paper we propose an alternative implementation of the...

We find that asymmetric information is important for the uptake of supplementary private health insurance and health care utilization. We use dynamic panel data models to investigate the sources of asymmetric information and distinguish short-run selection effects into insurance from long-run...

This paper examines the implications of insurers' offering a voluntary monitoring technology to insureds in automobile insurance markets with adverse selection and without commitment. Under the consideration of the inherent costs related to the loss of privacy, the paper analyzes the incentives...

We provide an experimental analysis of competitive insurance markets with adverse selection. Our parameterized version of the lemons' model (Akerlof 1970) in the insurance context predicts total crowding out of low-risks when insurers offer a single full insurance contract. The therapy proposed...

We consider a model of competitive insurance markets involving both asymmetric information and ambiguity about the accident probability. We show that there can exist a full-insurance pooling equilibrium. We also present an example where an increase in ambiguity leads to a strict Pareto...

We show that on-demand insurance contracts, an innovative form of coverage recently introduced through the InsurTech sector, can serve as a screening device. To this end, we develop a new adverse selection model consistent with Wilson (1977), Miyazaki (1977) and Spence (1978). Consumers have...

This paper characterizes the optimal information structure in insurance markets in the presence of adverse selection. The optimal information structure minimizes ex-post risk subject to a participation constraint for insurees and a break-even constraint from insurers. In the unique optimal...

We study a competitive insurance market in which insurers have an imperfect informative advantage over policyholders. We show that the presence of insurers privately and heterogeneously informed about risk can explain the concentration levels, the persistent profitability and the pooling of risk...