In an ultimatum bargaining experiment, we study how subjects bargain over the returns to their investments of money and time. The most notable finding is that a third of the subjects demand no compensation for their time investments, whereas almost all subjects demand compensation for equally...

"Beauty contests" are well-studied, dominance-solvable games that generate two interesting results. First, most behavior does not conform to the unique Nash equilibrium. Second, there is considerable unexplained heterogeneity in behavior. In this work, we explore the relationship between beauty...

Many people are sensitive to social esteem, and their pride is a source of pro--social behavior. We present a game-theoretic model in which sensitivity to esteem varies across players and may depend on context as well players' beliefs about their opponents. For example, the pride associated with...

Desire for social esteem is a source of prosocial behavior. We develop a model in which actors' utility of esteem depends on the audience. In a principal agent setting, we show that the model can account for motivational crowding out. Control systems and pecuniary incentives erode morale by...

Empirical evidence suggests that people on average overestimate their own ability in a variety of circumstances. Little is known, however, about the origins of such overconfidence. To shed some light on this issue, we use the classic twin design to estimate the genetic and environmental...

Robustness reproductions and replicability discussions are on the rise in response to concerns about a potential credibility crisis in economics. This paper proposes a protocol to structure reproducibility and replicability assessments, with a focus on robustness. Starting with a computational...

Robustness reproductions and replicability discussions are on the rise in response to concerns about a potential credibility crisis in economics. This paper proposes a protocol to structure reproducibility and replicability assessments, with a focus on robustness. Starting with a computational...

Guilt averse individuals experience a utility loss if they believe they let someone down. For example, generosity depends on what the donor believes that the recipient expects to receive. We measure guilt aversion in three separate experiments: a dictator game experiment, a complete information...