The asymptotic value, introduced by Kannai in 1966, is an asymptotic approach to the notion of the Shapley value for games with infinitely many players. A vector measure game is a game v where the worth v(S) of a coalition S is a function f of ?(S) where ? is a vector measure. Special classes of...

The existence of a value and optimal strategies is proved for the class of twoperson repeated games where the state follows a Markov chain independently of players’ actions and at the beginning of each stage only player one is informed about the state. The results apply to the case of standard...

Let G = (I,J,g) be a two-person zero-sum game. We examine the two-person zero-sum repeated game G(k,m) in which player 1 and 2 place down finite state automata with k,m states respectively and the payoff is the average per stage payoff when the two automata face off. We are interested in the...

Every two person repeated game of symmetric incomplete information, in which the signals sent at each stage to both players are identical and generated by a state and moves dependent probability distribution on a given finite alphabet, has an equilibrium payoff.

We introduce a model of communication with dynamic state of nature. We rely on entropy as a measure of information, characterize the set of expected empirical distributions that are achievable. We present applications to games with and without common interests.Classification JEL : C61, C73, D82.