We study how uniformed traders (defined as strategic traders not endowed with private information) use public disclosure and prices to form beliefs and trade. We manipulate the availability of public forecasts (e.g. earnings forecasts) of forthcoming public signals (e.g., earnings...

We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction in a laboratory experiment where bidders can signal information through their bidding behavior to an outside observer. We consider two different information settings: the auctioneer...

We report the results of a laboratory experiment based on a citizen‐candidate model with private information about ideal points. Inefficient political polarization is observed in all treatments; that is, citizens with extreme ideal points enter as candidates more often than moderate citizens....

We experimentally investigate the relationship between (un)kind actions and subsequent deception in a two-player, two-stage game. The first stage involves a dictator game. In the second-stage, the recipient in the dictator game has the opportunity to lie to her counterpart. We study how the...

I experimentally investigate observational (social) learning in the simple two-armed bandit framework where the models based on Bayesian reasoning and non-Bayesian reasoning (count heuristics) have different predictions. The results contradict the predictions of the Bayesian rationality e.g....

Unfavorable news are often delivered under the disguise of vagueness. But are people sufficiently naive to be fooled by such positive spin? We use a theoretical model and a laboratory experiment to study the strategic use of vagueness in a voluntary disclosure game. Consider a sender who aims at...

We use a laboratory experiment to study the effects of disclosing the number of active participants in contests with endogenous entry. At the first stage potential participants decide whether to enter competition, and at the second stage entrants choose their investments. In a 2×2 design, we...