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An experimental test of career concerns
Koch, Alexander K.; Morgenstern, Albrecht; Raab, Philippe - Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London - 2004
Holmström’s (1982/99) career concerns model has become an important workhorse for the analysis of agency issues in many fields. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way – which may or may not reasonably approximate real-life decision...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005652694
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Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal-Agent Experiment
Anderhub, Vital; Gaechter, Simon; Koenigstein, Manfred - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …
We study behavior within a simple principal--agent experiment. Our design allows for a large class of linear contracts. Principals can offer any feasible combination of (negative) fixed wages and incentives in the form of return sharing. This great contractual flexibility allows us to study...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627819
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An Experimental Test of Career Concerns
Koch, Alexander K.; Morgenstern, Albrecht; Raab, Philippe - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2004
Holmström’s (1982/99) career concerns model has become an important workhorse for the analysis of agency issues in many fields. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way – which may or may not reasonably approximate real-life decision...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005566605
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Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal-agent experiment
Anderhub, Vital; Gächter, Simon; Königstein, Manfred - Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und … - 1999
our experiments many contracts proposed by principals are 'incentive compatible' and most agents behave optimally given …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010983718
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An experimental test of career concerns
Koch, Alexander K.; Morgenstern, Albrecht; Raab, Philippe - University of Bonn, Germany - 2004
Holmström’s (1982/99) career concerns model has become an important workhorse for the analysis of agency issues in many fields. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way – which may or may not reasonably approximate real-life decision...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004989627
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Time is not money
Ellingsen, Tore (contributor);  … - 2007
time domain. -- Altruism ; Bargaining ; Non-monetary generosity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003476316
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Supplement to 'An Empirical Model of Bargaining with Equilibrium of Fear : Application to Retail Mergers in the French Soft Drink Industry'
Bonnet, Céline; Bouamra-Mechemache, Zohra; Molina, Hugo - 2023
manufacturers determined via the "Nash-in-Nash" bargaining solution, the computation of the out-of-equilibrium retail prices … following a bargaining breakdown, the algorithm used to simulate counterfactuals in our bilateral oligopoly model, the … analytical derivatives of standard errors of the Nash bargaining weights …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014350156
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An Empirical Model of Bargaining with Equilibrium of Fear : Application to Retail Mergers in the French Soft Drink Industry
Bonnet, Céline; Bouamra-Mechemache, Zohra; Molina, Hugo - 2021
bilateral bargains with retailers competing on a downstream market. We show that bargaining outcomes depend on three different … bargaining forces and can be interpreted in terms of “equilibrium of fear”. We estimate our framework using data on soft drink … purchases in France and find that retailers have a higher bargaining power than manufacturers. Using counterfactual simulations …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324359
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Time is not money
Ellingsen, Tore; Johannesson, Magnus - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2006
Casual observation suggests that people are more generous with their time than with their money. In this paper we present experimental evidence supporting the hypothesis. A third of our subjects demand no compensation for non-monetary investments, whereas almost all subjects demand compensation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005771168
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Price vs. Quantity Competition in a Vertically Related Market Revisited
Basak, Debasmita; Mukherjee, Arijit - 2016
In a recent paper, Alipranti et al. (2014, Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related market, Economics Letters, 124: 122-126) show that in a vertically related market Cournot competition yields higher social welfare compared to Bertrand competition if the upstream firm subsidises...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011584921