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Why Do People Pay for Useless Advice? Implications of Gambler's and Hot-Hand Fallacies in False-Expert Setting
Powdthavee, Nattavudh; Riyanto, Yohanes E. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012
We investigated experimentally whether people can be induced to believe in a non-existent expert, and subsequently pay for what can only be described as transparently useless advice about future chance events. Consistent with the theoretical predictions made by Rabin (2002) and Rabin and Vayanos...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279343
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Why Do People Pay for Useless Advice?
Powdthavee, Nattavudh; Riyanto, Yohanes E. - Centre for Economic Performance, LSE - 2012
We investigated experimentally whether people can be induced to believe in a non-existent expert, and subsequently pay for what can only be described as transparently useless advice about future chance events. Consistent with the theoretical predictions made by Rabin (2002) and Rabin and Vayanos...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010554888
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Why do people pay for useless advice? : implications of gambler's and hot-hand fallacies in false-expert setting
Powdthavee, Nattavudh; Riyanto, Yohanes Eko - 2012
error made systematically by people is large. -- gambler's fallacy ; hot-hand ; random streak ; expertise ; information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009537573
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Why Do People Pay for Useless Advice? Implications of Gambler's and Hot-Hand Fallacies in False-Expert Setting
Powdthavee, Nattavudh - 2012
We investigated experimentally whether people can be induced to believe in a non-existent expert, and subsequently pay for what can only be described as transparently useless advice about future chance events. Consistent with the theoretical predictions made by Rabin (2002) and Rabin and Vayanos...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013106012
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The value of verbal feedback in allocation decisions
Schmidt, Robert J.; Schwieren, Christiane; Vollmann, Martin - 2020
Depending on the context at hand, people's preference for receiving feedback might differ. Especially in allocation decisions that directly concern another individual, feedback from the affected person can have positive or negative value. We study such preferences in a laboratory experiment by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012169494
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Overweighting private information: Three measures, one bias?
Fellner, Gerlinde; Krügel, Sebastian - 2010
Overweighting private information is often used to explain various detrimental decisions. In behavioral economics and … learning to obtain a direct measure for overweighting private information. We find that overweighting private information and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281612
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Overweighting private information : three measures, one bias?
Fellner, Gerlinde; Krügel, Sebastian - 2010
Overweighting private information is often used to explain various detrimental decisions. In behavioral economics and …-cue probability learning to obtain a direct measure for overweighting private information. We find that overweighting private … information and measures of "miscalibration" are unrelated, indicating that different kinds of misperceptions are at work. Thus …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008669956
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Can we manage first impressions in cooperation problems? An experimental study on "Broken (and Fixed) Windows"
Engel, Christoph; Kube, Sebastian; Kurschilgen, Michael - 2011
information about (un)cooperative behavior in other, unrelated, groups. We observe that contributions are considerably sensitive … to such selective information. First impressions participants happen to make predict subsequent behavior. Our results …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281841
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Are people conditionally honest? : the effects of stakes and information about others' behavior
Le Maux, Benoît; Masclety, David; Necker, Sarah - 2020 - Preliminary draft
We study theoretically and empirically how monetary incentives and information about others' behavior affects … decrease when stakes are very high. On average, information about others slightly increases the fraction of liars but has no … effect on the size of the lie. Distinguishing subjects by their belief on others' behavior, we find that information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012422359
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : an experiment on voluntary payments, competition, and reputation in markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2016
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011530053