. -- promotion ; signaling ; internal labor markets … workers are assumed to come from a group with lower average ability. Their promotion is hypothesized to signal a larger … positive assessment of their ability than for more highly educated workers for whom promotion is expected. Promotions for …

workers are assumed to come from a group with lower average ability. Their promotion is hypothesized to signal a larger … positive assessment of their ability than for more highly educated workers for whom promotion is expected. Promotions for … younger workers, with less known about their abilities, should also result in strong signaling effects. We find results in …

workers are assumed to come from a group with lower average ability. Their promotion is hypothesized to signal a larger … positive assessment of their ability than for more highly educated workers for whom promotion is expected. Promotions for … younger workers, with less known about their abilities, should also result in strong signaling effects. We find results in …

workers are assumed to come from a group with lower average ability. Their promotion is hypothesized to signal a larger … positive assessment of their ability than for more highly educated workers for whom promotion is expected. Promotions for … younger workers, with less known about their abilities, should also result in strong signaling effects. We find results in …