A reason-based choice correspondence rationalizes choice behaviour in terms of a two-stage choice procedure. Given a feasible set <i>S</i>, the individual eliminates from it all of the dominated alternatives according to her fixed (not necessarily complete) strict preference relation, in the first...

We model a boundedly rational agent who suffers from limited attention. The agent considers each feasible alternative with a given (unobservable) probability, the attention parameter, and then chooses the alternative that maximises a preference relation within the set of considered alternatives....

We propose an extension of Tversky's lexicographic semiorder to a model of boundedly rational choice. We explore the connection with sequential rationalisability of choice, and we provide axiomatic characterisations of both models in terms of observable choice data. -- Lexicographic semiorders ;...

We study a psychologically based foundation for choice errors. The decision maker applies a preference ranking after forming a 'consideration set' prior to choosing an alternative. Membership of the consideration set is determined both by the alternative specific salience and by the rationality...

Behavioural welfare economics provides tools to elicit welfare preferences when individuals use nonstandard behavioural models. Current proposals either require assumptions on the models or elicit preferences that become coarser and coarser as the dataset grows. We propose an informational...

In Tversky's (1969) model of a lexicographic semiorder, preference is generated by the sequential application of numerical criteria, by declaring an alternative x better than an alternative y if the first criterion that distinguishes between x and y ranks x higher than y by an amount exceeding a...

We generalize the standard revealed preference exercise in economics, and prove a sufficient condition under which the revealed preference formulation of an economic theory has universal implications and when these implications can be recursively enumerated. We apply our theorem to two theories...

We model a boundedly rational agent who suffers from limited attention. The agent considers each feasible alternative with a given (unobservable) probability,the attention parameter, and then chooses the alternative that maximises a preference relation within the set of considered alternatives....

We study a psychologically based foundation for choice errors. The decision maker applies a preference ranking after forming a 'consideration set' prior to choosing an alternative. Membership of the consideration set is determined both by the alternative specific salience and by the rationality...