No voters cast their votes based on perfect information, but better educated and richer voters are on average better informed than others. We develop a model where the voting mistakes resulting from low political knowledge reduce the weight of poor voters, and cause parties to choose political...

I study the effect of voters with a group-based social conscience. Voters care more about the well-being of those belonging to their own group than the rest of the population. Within a model of political tax determination, both fractionalization and group antagonism reduce the support for...

Using matched administrative election data from Norway, we document gender-specific turnout rates by a range of socio-economic outcomes as well as family relationships and immigrant status. High social rank is consistently associated with higher turnout: we find significant turnout gradients for...

Our lab experiment tests for strategic ignorance about the environmental consequences of one's actions. In a binary dictator situation based on the design by Dana, Weber, and Kuang (2007), we test whether the option to remain ignorant about the receiver's payoffs reduces generosity. Our receiver...

A common approach to defining equivalence scales is to consider a household modelled as if it maximizes a single utility function. This may be founded on an assumption of the household maximizing a welfare function of individual utilities. For a positive analysis of the household, this may be...

The time series nature of repeated surveys is seldom taken into account. I present a statistical model of repeated surveys and construct a computationally feasible estimator based on the Kalman filter. The novelty is that the estimator efficiently uses the whole underlying data set. However, for...