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Right on Schedule : CEO Option Grants and Opportunism
Daines, Robert - 2016
prices. We provide evidence that in recent years some CEOs manipulate stock prices to increase option compensation. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013006948
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Chapter 4. Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got There
Murphy, Kevin J. - 2013
In this study, I summarize the current state of executive compensation, discuss measurement and incentive issues … the past century. Most recent analyses of executive compensation have focused on efficient-contracting or managerial … been both a response to and a major driver of time trends in executive compensation over the past century, and that any …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025560
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The Determinants of Stock Option Compensation: Evidence from Finland
Jones, Derek C.; Kalmi, Panu; Mäkinen, Mikko - Elinkeinoelämän Tutkimuslaitos (ETLA) - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005700262
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Employee stock options
Børsum, Øystein - 2010
tied to firm performance, because only a worker in a good quality firm would be willing to defer compensation to an … to defer compensation to an uncertain future, getting paid only if the firm succeeds. Moreover, in an important pooling …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010285589
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Optimal incentive contracts when workers envy their boss
Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2006
A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. This article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the worker's participation constraint and so calls...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335185
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Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in Financial Firms : The Case for Convertible Equity-Based Pay
Gordon, Jeffrey N. - 2014
operations and as the firm approaches financial distress, the paper proposes a new compensation mechanism for senior managers … stock price decline of a particular percentage, such stock-based compensation should convert into subordinated debt, at a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013069658
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Optimal Incentive Contracts when Workers envy their Boss
Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - 2004
A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. This article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the worker's participation constraint and so calls...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325487
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Optimal incentive contracts for a worker who envies his boss : presented at CESifo Venice Summer Institute, Workshop on Dissecting Globalization, July 2004
Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2004
A worker's utility may increase in his own income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. Such behavior may call for high-powered incentives, so that increased effort by the worker little increases the income of his employer. This paper uses a principalagent model to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011450877
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Optimal incentive contracts for a worker who envies his boss
Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - 2004
A worker's utility may increase in his own income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. Such behavior may call for high-powered incentives, so that increased effort by the worker little increases the income of his employer. This paper uses a principalagent model to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261264
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Optimal Incentive Contracts when Workers envy their Boss
Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004
A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. This article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the worker's participation constraint and so calls...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256032