A voting scheme assigns to each profile of alternatives chosen by "n" individuals a compromise alternative. Here the … strictly convex norm, common to all agents. A voting scheme is strategy-proof, if voting for one's best point is an optimal …

equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and …

equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and …

equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and …

with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to … investigate the robustness of equilibria to uncertainty about opponents' awareness of actions. We show that a Nash equilibrium of …

with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to … investigate the robustness of equilibria to uncertainty about opponents' awareness of actions. We show that a Nash equilibrium of …

A common feature of many speculative attack models on currencies is the existence of multiple equilibrium solutions …. When choosing the equilibrium strategy a trader faces Knightian uncertainty about the rational choice of the other traders … currency attack models. The uniqueness of the equilibrium remains valid for arbitrary noise distributions, positively …

The order and lattice structure of the equilibrium set in games with strategic complements do not survive a minimal … comparable. In such cases, the equilibrium set is a non-empty, complete lattice, if, and only if, there is a unique equilibrium …. Moreover, in such cases, with linearly ordered strategy spaces, the game has at most one symmetric equilibrium. Several …