voting body may affect the balance of power between the original members even if their number of votes and the decision rule … majority voting rules, and we measure the voting power of a player by his average payoff in the experiment. By comparing voting … power across voting bodies of varying size, we find empirical support for the paradox of new members. Our results also allow …

Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may affect the balance of power between the original … phenomenon known as the paradox of new members. We show that the paradox can occur as an equilibrium of a noncooperative … bargaining game based on the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model of legislative bargaining. We implement this game in the laboratory and …

Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may affect the balance of power between the original … phenomenon known as the paradox of new members. We show that the paradox can occur as an equilibrium of a noncooperative … bargaining game based on the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model of legislative bargaining. We implement this game in the laboratory and …

characteristics to others. The model is one of rational voting and generates the following predictions: (i) The paradox of not voting … does not arise, because the benefit of voting does not vanish with population size. (ii) Turnout in elections is positively … related to the size of the local community and the importance of social interactions. (iii) Voting may exhibit bandwagon …

Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may affect the balance of power between the original … phenomenon known as the paradox of new members. We show that the paradox can occur as an equilibrium of a noncooperative … bargaining game based on the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model of legislative bargaining. We implement this game in the laboratory and …

characteristics to others. The model is one of rational voting and generates the following predictions: (i) The paradox of not voting … does not arise, because the benefit of voting does not vanish with population size. (ii) Turnout in elections is positively … related to the size of the local community and the importance of social interactions. (iii) Voting may exhibit bandwagon …

Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may affect the balance of power between the original … phenomenon known as the paradox of new members. We show that the paradox can occur as an equilibrium of a noncooperative … bargaining game based on the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model of legislative bargaining. We implement this game in the laboratory and …

voting body may affect the balance of power between the original members even if their number of votes and the decision rule … majority voting rules, and we measure the voting power of a player by his average payoff in the experiment. By comparing voting … power across voting bodies of varying size, we find empirical support for the paradox of new members. Our results also allow …

Equilibrium assumptions posit relations between different people's beliefs and behavior without describing a process … that causes these relations to hold. I show that because equilibrium models do not describe a causal process whereby one … misleading predictions about how these models work. Equilibrium assumptions also imply absurd paradoxes: history can determine …

equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and …