with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to … investigate the robustness of equilibria to uncertainty about opponents' awareness of actions. We show that a Nash equilibrium of …

characteristics to others. The model is one of rational voting and generates the following predictions: (i) The paradox of not voting … does not arise, because the benefi t of voting does not vanish with population size. (ii) Turnout in elections is … positively related to the size of the local community and the importance of social interactions. (iii) Voting may exhibit …

In Poisson games, an extension of perfect equilibrium based on perturbations of the strategy space does not guarantee …. We characterize the right space of perturbations to define perfect equilibrium in Poisson games. Furthermore, we use such …

We distinguish between (i) voting systems in which voters can rank candidates and (ii) those in which they can grade … candidates, such as approval voting, in which voters can give two grades—approve (1) or not approve (0)—to candidates. While two …

theory of economic voting implicitly assumed that the government is held responsible for the economic conditions of the … voting decision takes place in two stages: On the one hand, the voter subjectively assigns the responsibility to the … government. On the other hand, she decides her voting option as a function of her sociotropic prospective evaluation and her …

Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may affect the balance of power between the original … phenomenon known as the paradox of new members. We show that the paradox can occur as an equilibrium of a noncooperative … bargaining game based on the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model of legislative bargaining. We implement this game in the laboratory and …

Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may affect the balance of power between the original … phenomenon known as the paradox of new members. We show that the paradox can occur as an equilibrium of a noncooperative … bargaining game based on the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model of legislative bargaining. We implement this game in the laboratory and …

characteristics to others. The model is one of rational voting and generates the following predictions: (i) The paradox of not voting … does not arise, because the benefit of voting does not vanish with population size. (ii) Turnout in elections is positively … related to the size of the local community and the importance of social interactions. (iii) Voting may exhibit bandwagon …

characteristics to others. The model is one of rational voting and generates the following predictions: (i) The paradox of not voting … does not arise, because the benefit of voting does not vanish with population size. (ii) Turnout in elections is positively … related to the size of the local community and the importance of social interactions. (iii) Voting may exhibit bandwagon …

Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may affect the balance of power between the original … phenomenon known as the paradox of new members. We show that the paradox can occur as an equilibrium of a noncooperative … bargaining game based on the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model of legislative bargaining. We implement this game in the laboratory and …